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This thesis examines the future of United States nuclear
strategy from the alternative futures/scenarios methodological
approach. It begins by tracing the evolution of U.S. declara-
tory strategic policy from the end of World War II to the
present. Specifically, it focuses on those particular envi-
ronmental threats, constraints, and resources that were funda-
mental to the development of a nuclear strategy for each time
period. The same kind of analysis is used to examine four
alternative future security environments. Specific nuclear
strategies are then developed for each alternative world
scenar io
.
The U.S. Navy's Maritime Strategy, especially the nuclear
component, is presented as an example of the strategy develop-
ment process. Finally, the process of strategic planning in
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The atomic explosions at the end of World War II signaled
a new era in modern warfare. Already, the twentieth century
had been the most destructive in history in terms of loss of
life and destruction as a direct result of wars. Yet the
atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki by the United
States demonstrated an even greater element for wartime catas-
trophe. Since that time, however, the major preoccupation for
military and political leaders has been searching for ways to
prevent the further use of these destructive weapons. The
irony of this effort, however, has been the continued develop-
ment of nuclear weapons and strategies in parallel with the
evolution of measures to prevent their use.
While efforts to ban the use of nuclear weapons and even
measures to abolish their existence are to be applauded, the
simple fact is their creation cannot be undone. The technolo-
gy exists and will continue to exist in the future. Thus,
again, while measures must be adopted and adapted to ensure
the use of nuclear weapons will not occur, the possession of
such weapons requires some thinking as to their utility. For
the military strategic planner, this means considering changes
to long-range nuclear strategies that will adapt to various
future environments. Moreover, such strategies must include
measures for the actual employment of nuclear weapons in the
event that deterrence should fail. A nation's very survival
in the future may depend on its ability to develop nuclear
strategies that are designed to handle a number of contingen-
cies if deterrence fails. Clearly, no one likes to hear that,
but such displacement will not make the possibility go away.
This requires even more the ability to plan for such an occur-
rence and develop credible strategies to ensure the nation's,
even the world's survival. Dennis M. Drew and Donald M. Snow
echo this justification for planning a credible nuclear
strategy for the United States:
Nuclear war remains a special case for the
strategist. It is the only contingency for which
strategy aims largely, if not wholly, at the avoidance
of employing military forces in pursuit of national
ends. It is also arguably the least likely form of
warfare in which the United States might engage, but
its potential is also the most consequential. Since
national destruction remains a possible result of
engaging in nuclear hostilities, the security dilemma
is indeed a real factor that hangs like a Damoclean
sword over this entire area of strategic concern. [1]
For the past four decades U.S. defense policy has re-
volved around the concept of deterrence. Moreover, nuclear
weapons have been instrumental in the formulation and imple-
mentation of defense planning and policy. The absence of
global war since WW II appears to have supported deterrence as
the keynote to a successful U.S. defense policy. Still, what
has encouraged peace in recent times does not guarantee the
same in a changing present and uncertain future environment.
The postwar bipolar structure is truly giving way to a
multipolar world with a multitude of new players every day.
Current trends in economics, demographics, and technology
demonstrate this shift in the international arena. Moreover,
these trends signal the need for reevaluation of the military
and defense plans necessary to achieve national objectives in
support of the national interests. In particular, the
nation's nuclear strategy must be addressed within the context
of the changing security environment. This allows the devel-
opment of new policies and strategies as U.S. foreign and
domestic interests change.
Presumably, there is a distinct set of factors which
consistently must be addressed in the formulation of U.S.
nuclear strategy/policy. These factors should not only guide
strategic nuclear doctrine but influence the development of
the strategic forces to implement that doctrine. Moreover,
these same factors should be able to be applied by long-range
planners to forecast or recommend future strategies and force
structures to fit the changed environment.
In a broad sense, there are generally three categories
which directly affect U.S. military strategy formulation and
force structure development. They are the military, politi-
cal, and technical aspects of the national security planning
process. Obviously, within each of the three broad categories
there are more specific factors which directly and indirectly
affect weapons development, procurement/acquisition, and
strategy/doctrine articulation. The purpose of this study,
however, is to consider only those changes in the future
security environment that affect the development of U.S.
nuclear strategy. As a result, the future world environment
is analyzed from the perspective of threats, constraints, and
resources .
Obviously, there are other factors to be considered in
the development of U.S. nuclear strategy than the environment.
Indeed, the underlying concept for all national security
strategy formulation and military development is the "national
interest." In other words, the development of any national
security strategy generally begins with the articulation of a
fundamental set of values and interests. Next in the process
is stating broad goals or objectives that support the national
interests. Finally, the specific strategy is formulated by
considering the national interests and objectives and assess-
ing nation's particular current strengths and weaknesses [ 2 ]
.
The assumption in this study, however, is that the national
interests and objectives remain the same in the long-range
futures that are analyzed. Therefore, considerations for
long-range national nuclear strategies are based strictly on
changes in the future world environment.
Once again, this study is developed explicitly from the
perspective of a military strategic planner oriented toward
nuclear weapons strategy. Thus, the first chapter examines
the purpose, process, and methodologies essential to strategic
planning in the military. In addition to the discussing
current problems and the various methodologies employed in
long-range planning, trend analysis and forecasting in general
will be discussed briefly in this section. Finally, the
alternative futures/scenarios methodology will be presented as
a valuable tool for the military strategic planner and the one
used exclusively in this study.
The next chapter examines the evolution of U.S. nuclear
strategy from the end of World War II through the 1970s. This
examination is not intended as simply a rehash of well-known
historical events. Instead, it is an examination of the
development of U.S. nuclear strategy from the perspective of
threats, constraints, and resources. This analysis is con-
cluded in the next section of the study through the examina-
tion of the most recent U.S. nuclear strategies using the same
three factors. In addition, this chapter focuses on one armed
services' role within the national nuclear strategy by examin-
ing the U.S. Navy's Maritime Strategy. Moreover, again, the
development of the Maritime Strategy, especially the nuclear
component, is examined from the same perspective of threats,
constraints, and resources.
Alternative future environments will be discussed in the
next chapter by presenting Charles W. Taylor's Alternative
World Scenarios For Strategic Planning[3]. A number of stud-
ies have considered alternative strategic futures and the
implications for U.S. military planningt4]. Moreover, many of
these studies have similar conclusions about the future secu-
rity environment. Taylor's work was chosen, however, more to
highlight the alternative futures/scenarios methodology than
to stress his results. Nevertheless, this book has been
critiqued by scholars in the field who concluded that Taylor's
methodology and results were sound[5]. This at least lends
some credibility to this study's use of Taylor's four future
environments for developing long-range U.S. nuclear strategies
based on changing world conditions. In addition, there is
enough variance between his four alternative futures to force
strategic planners to seriously think through different nucle-
ar strategies for each scenario.
Perhaps the most important section of this study is the
last chapter which postulates a U.S. nuclear strategy for each
of Taylor's four future world scenarios. While the strategies
are intended to be broad statements of future U.S. nuclear
policy, they are based on the specific threats, constraints,
and resources that characterize each scenario. Therefore,
this chapter demonstrates how the strategic planner can ana-
lyze the long-range environment using the alternative
futures/scenarios methodology. More importantly, it summa-
rizes this study's thesis that analyzing the future environ-
ment from the perspective of threats, constraints, and re-
sources helps planners develop long-range U.S. nuclear strate-
gies. Clearly, as "the role of strategy stands necessarily at
the center of any discussion of national security
planning, "[ 6 ] planning alternative U.S. nuclear strategies for
various future world scenarios is essential.
II. STRATEGIC PLANNING IN THE MILITARY
A. INTRODUCTION
The key to the development of a successful national
policy is planning. Specifically, strategic planning is
fundamental to any policymaking process, especially one de-
signed for implementation over the long term. This includes
prediction and forecasts, analysis of current and projected
trends, and periodic reevaluation of national objectives. As
military strength remains essential for U.S. security, the
defense planning process continues to be important in the
development of fundamental strategies to achieve national
objectives. This process involves the identification of
national values and security interests, threat assessments,
defense policy and military strategy formulation, and deter-
mining the most effective force structure to execute the
strategy! 7 ]
.
Correctly thinking through an organization's strategy or
strategic approach for long-term planning is not unique to the
military. In fact, it is in the corporate business world that
strategic planning is most often discussed. What makes
strategic planning in the military unique, however, is its
subject matter--war fare . As retired U.S. Army Lieutenant
General John H. Cushman writes:
Its subject is varfare--the employment of force and
military assets to achieve specified objectives. . .
their focus is more the operational employment of
military forces and the planning related thereto. [8]
The planning process becomes complicated when several
conceptual levels (e.g. strategy, operations, and tactics) of
warfare are considered. Moreover, warfare must be examined in
one of several domains, such as "strategic (or intercontinen-
tal) warfare," "maritime warfare," and "theater warfare. "[91
Finally, military planning encompasses the logistics and
administration of forces across a broad spectrum of warfare,
from minor engagements to major campaigns.
But strategic planning in the military is, or should be,
more than an operational plan for the employment of forces in
wartime, though that is fundamental to its mission. It should
also include social, economic, and demographic factors which
might impact on the military's mission (or ability to carry
out its defined mission), including its peacetime role.
Mostly, however, literature on military strategic planning is
filled with a description of the tools, principles, and forces
necessary to wage battles[10]. The importance of the war-
fighting ability of the military has not diminished. Again,
this includes warfare across a broad spectrum from low inten-
sity conflict to general nuclear war. Nevertheless, under
contemporary conditions, military strategic long-range plan-
ning should include a forecast of all the factors that might
affect the military's ability to support the national inter-
ests. This is particularly true in the development of nuclear
8
strategy given the possible consequences of an inadequate
strategy should deterrence fail.
That effective long-term strategic planning is essential
to the development of policies and strategies that fit the na-
tional objectives in support of the national interests appears
obvious enough. What is not so clear, however, is how to
conduct effective strategic planning--i .e . what methodologies
should be used?
In choosing a forecasting method, several desirable
properties are useful as criteria for selection ( 11 ] . The
methodology must be comprehensive but simple to use and under-
stand; it must be plausible and explicit, allowing for repro-
ducibility; finally, the methodology should incorporate exist-
ing theory yet be sensitive to nuances. Other factors such as
the skills and resources needed and the time and effort re-
quired are important as well. Moreover, the methodological
approach will vary with the kind of problem to be examined and
the expertise and experience of the forecaster [ 12 ] . Still,
these criteria are useful as guidelines in the selection of
the best method for the given problem.
In general, forecasting techniques can be roughly divided
into structuring techniques and qual itative/ judgmental meth-
ods [13], The former employs systems analysis and networking
theory to define the elements of and examine relationships
between systems. This methodology includes analysis of spe-
cific system parameters through the examination of performance
measures, costs, limits, capabilities, key events, and alter-
natives. The one shortcoming with these techniques is that
upon first inspection anything considered irrelevant to a
given system is automatically excluded. Thus, an element that
could be critical to the development of a system may not be
included
.
The second methodological grouping employed in forecast-
ing, as its name implies, is more qualitative than the former.
These methods offer predictions about the future by individual
and group analysts or "experts." This use of expert judgment,
common to many forecasting approaches is especially valuable
as a forecasting technique when considering new untested
areas. Among the various approaches within this methodology
are the simple poll or panel of experts, the Delphi technique,
and scenario methods. The first two approaches search for
consensus within forecasting groups. Scenarios, on the other
hand, emphasize uncertainty and forecast plausible alternative
futures[14]. This last approach will be discussed in much
greater detail later.
The discussion of strategic planning and forecasting thus
far has only briefly touched on the various methodological
techniques employed toward that end. To be sure, there are a
variety of methods that can be used by the forecaster in the
approach to any specific problem. Among these are: extrapo-
lation, regressions, leading indicators, complex models, curve
fitting, forecasting by analogy, and multiple-source forecast-
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ing[15]. Without going into any detail on any of these tech-
niques, suffice it to say that the variety of approaches used
by forecasters, often in combination, are dependent on the
subject matter and problem to be explored.
B. TREND ANALYSIS
Closely related to the forecasting technique of extrapo-
lation but deserving of separate discussion is trend analysis.
Mostly quantitative and utilizing statistical techniques,
trend analysis is used to forecast into the future values of a
given variable from the analysis of past (and present) rela-
tionships among two or more sets of data. While there are
many different techniques, trend analysis often "serves as
both a basis for and a complement to many other, more elabo-
rate forecasting methods ."[ 16 ] This is particularly true with
long-range planning and forecasting in the military.
As with most forecasting techniques, several assumptions,
characteristics, and qualifications underlie all trend analy-
sis methods. First, and perhaps most important, is the as-
sumption that what characterized the relationships between
variables in the past will be the same in the future. Equally
important and similar is the assumption in the continuity of
all the factors and conditions upon which a particular trend
is based. Other critical elements include the time span for
the analysis and the availability of reliable data over that
same period. Finally, the statistical techniques used to
identify the trends in variables and the relationships between
11
the same must be deemed valid[17]. These assumptions could
more accurately be described as limitations or disadvantages
in using a particular methodology. Nevertheless, trend analy-
sis can be very useful to other forecasting approaches de-
signed for the long-term by extrapolating current trends to
the hypothesized future. This is especially true with the
alternative futures/scenarios methodology applied to military
strategic planning.
C. SCENARIOS
From the above discussion it is apparent that many tech-
niques and methodologies may be employed in strategic planning
and forecasting. How to decide which one is best depends on
several factors including the subject matter, the expertise
and choice of the analysts, and the spatial and temporal frame
of reference. This study will restrict itself to the examina-
tion of the scenarios and developmental constructs ap-
proach[18] mentioned earlier. Moreover, this specific method-
ology will be applied to the future national security concerns
for the U.S. with specific recommendations for nuclear strate-
gies in alternative future scenarios. It is clear that mili-
tary forecasters are increasingly adopting these kind of
methodologies for long-range planning. In fact, according to
Earl D. Cooper and Steven M. Shaker, "the U.S. Air Force,
Army, and Navy have all undertaken futures-studies projects in
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an effort both to prevent the outbreak of war and to better
protect the nation should war occur. "[19]
Scenarios are essentially hypothesized futures based on
given sets of conditions in specific areas of interest. Both
qualitative and quantitative, scenarios serve well as fore-
casting tools by providing a framework for analyzing specific
future issues and developments. The Defense Intelligence
Agency's Methodology Catalog provides a more general descrip-
tion of the use of scenarios as a forecasting methodology:
Scenarios serve well in a number of forecasting
situations. . . . Among the sort of problems that
scenarios address are the success, failure, or un-
anticipated effects of a particular decision or
strategy .... Scenarios can explicitly reflect
different and often competing points of view about
the future held by different experts in an area.
Finally, scenarios work well in spanning and encom-
passing significant alternatives when the future is
highly uncertain. The approach generally seeks to
clarify genuinely uncertain situations rather than to
predict where it is not possible to do so. In effect,
scenario analysts develop alternative forecasts based
on explicit, significantly different, but nevertheless
plausible sets of assumptions and logics about the
future. [20]
The analysts and the specific area of interest determine
explicitly how the scenarios approach is used as a forecasting
technique. Moreover, the point of focus in the strategic
planning and forecasting processes establishes the complexity
and general makeup of the scenarios themselves. Thus, from
one to several scenarios may be used to describe the postulat-
ed future for a given problem. While single scenario ap-
proaches are valid, however, they are generally avoided in
forecasting due to their limited expectations of the hypothe-
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sized future. Also referred to as the "surprise-free" ap-
proach, the single scenario is more useful for identifying and
analyzing the development of a consensus view of the future
based on the continuation of current trends[211.
More useful to the strategic planner is the multiple
scenario or alternative futures approach. The fact that
several alternative scenarios are developed for the hypothe-
sized future allows for a greater probability of encompassing
any uncertainty inherent in the planning process. Moreover,
the set of alternative future scenarios in combination should
describe the "most plausible" future for the analyst. Again,
this approach is particularly valuable to the military strate-
gic planner "as a basis for evaluating alternative strategic
and tactical situations in military environments ."[ 22
]
The use of this methodological approach by the military
and defense organization actually originated in the late 1940s
and early 1950s when Department of Defense planners used
scenarios for contingency planning [ 23 ] . Still, this early use
of scenarios was limited and only considered narrowly defined
topics. Later, in the 1960s, futurists like Herman Kahn ap-
plied the alternative futures/scenarios to the field of na-
tional secur ity[ 24 ] . This early work even included proposals
for alternative nuclear strategies for the U.S. in the fu-
ture[25]. Thus, the foundation for today's military strate-
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gic planning using the alternative futures and scenarios
methodology originated in the early postwar years.
D. SUMMARY
Once again, military strategic planning is a long-range
process that includes analyses of military and non-military
factors likely to affect the future role of defense to the na-
tional security of the United States. Because alternative
futures are essentially designed for long-range planning
models, they are an appropriate tool for the military strate-
gic planner in designing plausible strategies for the fu-
ture[26]. For that reason, the alternative futures and scena-
rios methodology is used exclusively in this study to examine
the future of U.S. nuclear strategy.
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III. THE EVOLUTION AND DEVELOPMENT OF U.S. NUCLEAR STRATEGY
A. INTRODUCTION
Before proceeding with this study of U.S. nuclear strate-
gy, the concept "strategy" must be clarified. Often what is
termed strategy can just as easily be referred to as doctrine
or policy. Moreover, nuclear strategy can be divided into
distinct levels known as declaratory strategy, development and
deployment strategy, and employment strategy[ 27 ] . Perhaps the
best definition of a nuclear strategy, at least for this
study, is that given by Aaron L. Friedberg: ". . .a set of
objectives, however crudely defined, and an accompanying plan
containing detailed targeting and employment require-
ments. . . ."[28]
Using that definition, therefore, this study will examine
the evolution of U.S. nuclear strategy from the immediate
postwar years through the 1970s. This evolution will be
divided into phases, which not coincidentally will correspond
to the various Presidential administrations that emerged
during this period. Although it will include doctrine, poli-
cy, and strategy, this examination will more accurately repre-
sent the evolution of U.S. declaratory strategic policy. More
importantly, however, it will focus specifically on the three
categories of threats, constraints, and resources, assumed
fundamental to the development of any nuclear strategy. These
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broad categories and the components of each will be highlight-
ed in the summary to each stage and the overall summary at the
end of this section.
B. The Evolution Of U.S. Declaratory Strategic Policy-'-
1. Phase I: 1945-1949
a. Introduction
As with the entire section of this study , much
has been written about the immediate postwar time period.
Specifically, as related to nuclear strategy, the postwar
years in the Truman administration were simply a continuation
of the strategic bombing lessons learned in World War II.
This was a period characterized by very few nuclear weapons,
although the United States had a monopoly on the ones that did
exist. Also well known is the fact that out of the Second
World War emerged two superpowers. For the United States as
one of those powers, it quickly became evident that the other
superpower (the Soviet Union) was the major adversary (or
threat )
.
As with most periods subsequent to major wars,
the United States began to demobilize militarily in 1945.
Still, in an effort to check the probable Soviet advance, the
U.S. adopted a strategy of containment as articulated by
George Kennan (NSC-20 ) [ 29 ] . At the same time, deterrence
1. A good summary of the evolution of U.S. declaratory strategic
policy, from which the title for this section was obtained, is
found in Ref . [ 60 ]
.
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became associated with the U.S. strategy to contain the USSR
by threatening nuclear retaliation should the Soviets engage
in imperialist aggression.
While a nuclear monopoly was maintained, howev-
er, the U.S. essentially had no nuclear strategy for most of
this period[30]. Moreover, as William H. Baugh notes: ". . .
the United States did little to acquire either a significant
stock of nuclear weapons or any effective means of delivering
them to targets over intercontinental distances ."[ 31 ] Worse
still was the fact that thoughts on the actual use of nuclear
weapons varied little from the traditional ideas for the
utility of weapons in wartime. That is, nuclear weapons were
considered only a more destructive weapon to be exploited as
any other traditional wartime munition[ 32 ] . Finally, the
secrecy which characterized the development of the atomic bomb
carried over into this period. As a result, outside of a
small group of scientists, very little was known about nuclear
weapons, even among the nation's leaders. Thus, what nuclear
doctrine did exist at that time was at best primitive. Dr.
Baugh echoes this sentiment:
Strategic doctrine of the period seems hardly to have
developed beyond expectations that nuclear bombs could
be used against cities with military potential or
production complexes, as had been done in Japan, and






b. Threats, Constraints, And Resources
Other works provide a more scholarly and better
detailed description of the evolution and development of U.S.
nuclear strategy during the immediate postwar time frame[34].
Nevertheless, from the brief examination of that period pre-
sented here one can already infer the elements that were and
are fundamental to the development of such a strategy. More-
over, those elements that most influenced nuclear thinking at
that time are easily grouped into the three broad categories
of threats, resources, and constraints. First, in the area of
threats, without question the Soviet Union became the primary
threat to U.S. interests and objectives. While it will be
argued later in this study that perhaps the focus of this
threat should be shifted, the USSR provided the early motiva-
tion for the United States' development of a nuclear strategy.
Clearly, without the perception of a significant threat there
is little justification for the continued development of new
weapons systems, let alone a strategy to accompany them.
Second, resources, or in this case the lack of
resources, specifically influenced the ability to develop a
credible nuclear strategy for the United States. Already
alluded to is the fact that "actual production capability at
the end of the war was only a few nuclear weapons per month,
and no intercontinental bombers yet existed . . . ."[35]
Moreover, even by 1948 only 32 modified B-29s capable of
carrying nuclear bombs existed, and by July of that year there
19
were only some 50 nuclear bombs in stock[36]. Finally, as for
human resources, personnel trained for nuclear weapons were
quite scarce; by early 1947 the Strategic Air Command had 20
trained air crews and only six weapons assembly special-
istst37] .
In the final category of constraints, several
elements combine to make this grouping perhaps most signifi-
cant to the development, or, again, lack or development, of a
U.S. nuclear strategy. Militarily, the nation was constrained
due to the massive demobilization at the end of the war. In
addition and related to that was the domestic constraint of
public indifference to any sort of military buildup or devel-
opment. After a long and costly (although arguably much less
so for the U.S.) war, the last thing anyone wanted to think
about was preparation for a future confrontation. This domes-
tic constraint (later broadly labeled "public opinion") clear-
ly hindered the development of nuclear employment and deploy-
ment strategy as well as the weapons to advance such a policy.
On the other hand, economic constraints allowed for nuclear
weapons to be justified as more cost-effective than their
conventional counterparts.^
c. Summary
In summary, then, the time frame 1945 to 1949
produced little thinking in the U.S. on the development of a
2. For a thorough treatment of the resources and constraints of
this period, see Ref. [34], pp. 1-71.
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strategy to accompany the small but unequaled stock of nuclear
weapons. Any thinking on the utility of nuclear weapons was
simply based on the strategic bombing carried out in World War
II. Moreover, nuclear weapons were not considered to be any
different in purpose or utility than conventional munitions,
only more destructive. Still, this period produced the foun-
dation for those elements considered fundamental to the devel-
opment of a nuclear strategy to this day. This includes the
USSR as the primary threat, the avoidance of nuclear war as a
prime objective (later articulated as the strategy of deter-
rence), and the resources and constraints essential to weapons
development and strategy formulation.
2. Phase II: 1950-1960
a. Introduction
The transition from the first to the second
phase in the evolution of U.S. declaratory strategic policy
was a rather slow one. That is, during the early stages of
this second phase little had changed in the way of thinking
about nuclear strategy. As Jerome H. Kahan notes:
. . . even after the Soviet Union's first atomic test
in 1949 and the completion one year later of a National
Security Council study (NSC-58) that contained cogent
analyses of defense requirements in a nuclear era, U.S.
doctrine continued to emphasize preatomic concepts of
strategic bombing and air superiority, defense of the
homeland, and victory in a war of attrition involving
conventional as well as atomic forces. [38]
Thus, during the late 1940s and early 1950s planners consid-
ered (and rightfully so) the U.S. and its allies immune to
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nuclear retaliation. In addition, they thought America's
nuclear capability served only as a counterweight to the
USSR's conventional military threat to Western Europe[39].
Even when the USSR began to acquire a small atomic arsenal
between 1949 and 1952, however, "the implications of atomic
weapons were still not fully translated into operational U.S.
military policies or programs ."[ 40
]
Still, during this phase there were changes in
the way the U.S. viewed the utility of nuclear weapons.
Moreover, changes in the threat (or threat perception), the
presence of constraints (mostly domestic), and the availabili-
ty of resources all influenced the U.S.'s new thinking on
nuclear strategy. These fundamental changes in combination
with several key international events helped bring about the
articulation of America's first declaratory strategic policy.
b. Threats
Under the category of threats, the Soviet Union
remained the primary threat to U.S. security. Moreover, as
the nature of this threat changed during this period, so did
U.S. thoughts on nuclear strategy. Again, before the USSR
possessed a nuclear capability, the U.S. thought little of its
atomic arsenal in terms of specific strategy. This all
changed (though not immediately) in 1949, however, when the
Soviets detonated their first atomic weapon and became a
member of the nuclear club. Following this detonation, the
Soviets immediately began to build an atomic arsenal. Never-
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theless, by the time President Truman left office at the end
of 1952, the Soviets "had not yet tested a thermonuclear
device nor flown a long-range jet bomber. "[41] In fact, the
"Soviet atomic capabil-ity in 1952 was estimated at only 50
bombs and 800 TU-4 bombers ." t 42
]
The time frame of 1953 to 1959 was known as the
"revolution in military affairs" in the Soviet Union(43].
This was essentially the Soviet recognition of the "atomic
fact" or, more specifically, recognition of the utility of
nuclear weapons. Moreover, it was the acknowledgment by the
Soviets of an entire new weapons system integrating the nucle-
ar weapon, the missile, and the necessary guidance and con-
trol[44]. As a result, by the mid-1950s, the USSR had ac-
quired a substantial nuclear capability, tested a thermonucle-
ar device, and developed intercontinental delivery vehicles
(bombers, then later ballistic miss i les ) [ 45 ] . Finally, events
like the launching of the Sputnik satellite in 1957 boosted
the USSR's credibility and forced the U.S. to reconsider its
entire nuclear strategy.
c. Constraints
For this specific time period, the category of
constraints can be broken down into two equally important
domestic components--economic and public opinion. Both of
these constraints influenced the development of nuclear
strategy and resulted from an important international event
for the United States--the Korean War. At the same time, the
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new Eisenhower administration came into office convinced of
the need to drastically reduce the defense budget, [46] mostly
based on the effects of these two constraints. Jerome Kahan
supports this assertion:
The President and his chief advisers were firmly con-
vinced of the need to drastically lower the level of
defense spending, since they viewed a balanced budget
as essential to a strong U.S. economy, which in turn
was judged vital for national security. Indeed, the
Korean experience had led to widespread public senti-
ment not only to bring the troops home but also to
reduce U.S. armed forces generally. [ 47
]
In addition to the Korean war, other interna-
tional events affected the development of U.S. nuclear strate-
gy during this period and, when taken together, can be consid-
ered another element of the category of constraints. Specifi-
cally, events like the Communist victory in China and the
growing Soviet domination in Eastern Europe presented new
problems for U.S. national security. This caused not only a
reevaluation of current national military strategies but
helped bring about an increased reliance on the utility of
nuclear weapons[48]. Clearly, changes in international al-
liance structures and security relationships fit into the
broad category of threats to U.S. security. During this time
period, however, these events also served to constrain U.S.
military options and enhance the reliance on nuclear weapons,
including the development of a nuclear strategy.
d. Resources
During this phase of the evolution and develop-
ment of U.S. nuclear strategy, the category of resources deals
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mostly with technological achievements in nuclear weapons and
their delivery systems. Again, while the U.S. maintained a
nuclear monopoly during the early stages of this period its
atomic arsenal was very limited. In terms of delivery sys-
tems, for example, by the end of 1952 "the strategic forces of
the United States still consisted of medium-range B-47 bombers
based abroad and a small fleet of relatively ineffective
propeller-driven B-36 aircraf t . " [ 49 ] Nevertheless, the early
1950s saw several major developments including the first
thermonuclear weapon tested by the United States in November
1952[50]. Much of the development in nuclear weapons and
strategy that occurred later in this period can be attributed
to "the Truman Administration's decisions to expand the U.S.
atomic stockpile and build the hydrogen bomb. "[51]
Examining President Truman's decisions to
expand the U.S. nuclear weapons capability, David Alan Rosen-
berg writes:
The three approved increases in nuclear production
may well have been the most substantive actions taken
by the Truman Administration in the area of strategic
nuclear policy during its last three years. By January
1953, a construction program was underway which would
add eight plutonium production reactors and ten gaseous
diffusion U-235 production plants to the five reactors
and two gaseous diffusion plants operating in mid-1950.
These plants and reactors were capable of supporting an
enormous expansion of the nuclear weapons stockpile .[ 52
]
As a result, the growth of the U.S. nuclear arsenal in the
1950s was massive. From an estimated 250 primitive atomic
bombs in 1949 to approximately 1000 weapons in the summer of
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1953, the U.S. arsenal grew to some 18,000 atomic and thermo-
nuclear weapons by 1960[53]. Moreover, while the number of
U.S. strategic nuclear delivery vehicles did not change great-
ly between 1954 and 1960, the total megatonnage increased over
twentyf old [ 54 ]
.
e. Targeting
Thus far, the subject of targeting as related
to the development of nuclear strategy has not been discussed
in this study. Just as any strategy requires the means to
achieve given objectives, however, targeting is fundamental to
the credibility of any nuclear strategy. Yet, given the
requirements to deliver a weapon to a specified target with
some probability of causing damage, targeting can more accu-
rately be categorized as a technological constraint. In the
early years (1945-1950), given its extremely small nuclear
arsenal, the U.S. had very limited means to deliver weapons to
distant targets. At the same time, there were only a few
target sets in the Soviet Union, outside of large urban and
industrial areas, considered valid for the use of nuclear
weapons. Aaron Friedberg describes this early focus on cities
for nuclear targeting:
. . . shortages and an absence of extremely "time-
urgent" targets (like Soviet nuclear weapons storage
sites and delivery vehicles) combined with prevailing
ideas about the utility of air power to shape early war
plans. Cities were targeted because it was believed
they could be found and hit from the air, because their
destruction was thought the best way to weaken the
Soviet military might, and because no other logical
target set existed. [55]
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Given the Soviet nuclear weapons developments and key interna-
tional events mentioned earlier, this situation began to
change in the 1950s.
As American planners became more concerned with
the growing Soviet threat, existing target lists were expanded
and subdivided into three categories: industrial facilities;
"retardation" targets (e.g. transportation links); and coun-
terforce targets[56]. Still, until the development of the
first SIOP the counterforce target set remained very small,
mostly due to operational and technical limitations [ 57 ]
.
Thus, in the SIOP "an ^optimum mix' of *high priority mili-
tary, industrial, and government control targets' was desig-
nated for destruction in a single, massive attack. "[58]
f. Summary
While the decade of the 1950s is often consid-
ered the foundation of America's nuclear strategy, the origins
can clearly be traced much earlier. The Truman
Administration's decisions to buildup the military (through
NSC-68) and further develop a nuclear capability, for example,
were instrumental in the formulation of a U.S. nuclear
strategy. Moreover, events like the Soviet Union's detonation
of an atomic device in 1949 helped shape U.S. nuclear strategy
throughout the decade and beyond[59]. Still, the 1950s saw
the expansion of America's nuclear posture, both in weapons
stockpile and capability and in strategic thought. The result
was the first formal articulation of a U.S. nuclear strategy
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on January 12, 1954 by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles
known as "massive retaliation ."[ 60
]
In addition to the massive retaliation policy,
other developments originated during this period that continue
to influence U.S. nuclear strategy today. The first fits into
the category of threats as its creation was essentially a
reaction to the Soviet nuclear buildup and the perceived
vulnerability of U.S. forces from that buildup. The result
was the development of the nuclear Triad, a "multiforce
strategic nuclear delivery capability consisting of bombers,
ICBMs, and submarine-launched ballistic missiles ( SLBMs ) . " [ 61
]
The other major development had more to do with
the actual employment of nuclear weapons in wartime. This was
the creation of the first national nuclear war plan, known as
SIOP-62 (Single Integrated Operational Plan) [62]. The SIOP
was, again, more concerned with the actual targeting of nucle-
ar weapons as discussed earlier.
Thus, the modern strategic nuclear era emerged
during the decade of the 1950s as the U.S. and USSR acquired
significant atomic arsenals including thermonuclear weapons
and advanced intercontinental delivery vehicles. Jerome Kahan
notes the results of these developments:
As a consequence of these technological developments,
each of the major powers would gain a credible military
capability to launch large-scale nuclear strikes from
its own territory against the other side's homeland.
The Eisenhower administration inherited the formidable
.
task of responding to this unprecedented situation and






And respond he did, for President Eisenhower
entered office with the conviction that by exploiting the
technology of nuclear weapons, the U.S. would be able to
achieve its national security objectives and reduce defense
spending at the same time [64]. The result was the New Look
policy (NSC-162/2), which emphasized reduced defense spending
and greater reliance on nuclear power[65].
The next phases in the evolution of the U.S.
nuclear strategy will be discussed in much less detail than
this one. Instead, the major developments in each stage of
declaratory policy will be highlighted under the three main
categories of threats, constraints, and resources.
3. Phase III: 1961-1980
a. Introduction
Recalling the definition of nuclear strategy
and its close association with doctrine and/or policy, this
phase could actually be divided into several stages depending
on the source[661. For this study, however, this phase will
be divided into two parts to conform to the evolution of U.S.
nuclear doctrine. The changes in U.S. declaratory strategic
policy will be highlighted, however, as will the key targeting
schemes. Once again, the fundamental changes for each stage
will be categorized as threats, constraints, or resources on
the assumption that these components are essential in the
development of nuclear strategy.
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b. 1961-1974 : Assured Destruction And Damage
Limitation
(1) Targeting. Even with an expanded list of
"optimum mix" targets, the first SIOP was limited to an all-
out, massive nuclear attack. Thus, the next step, as the
Kennedy Administration saw it, was to revise the SIOP in an
effort to introduce more flexibility to U.S. nuclear war
plans[67]. The result was a new SIOP with greater emphasis on
military installations and counterforce targets in general
(i.e. war-making capabilities), but also options for withhold-
ing attacks on cities, even countries [ 68 ] . The now famous Ann
Arbor speech of June 1962 by Secretary of Defense Robert S.
McNamara sums up this emphasis on counterforce targeting:
. . . principal military objectives, in the event of a
nuclear war stemming from a major attack on the Alli-
ance, should be the destruction of the enemy's military




This emphasis on targeting the enemy's
war-making capabilities continued on throughout the decade of
the 1960s and into the early 1970s. Thus, despite shifts in
declaratory policy that indicated a priority of attacks on
cities in a nuclear war, counterforce targeting remained the
focus of U.S. nuclear war plans[70].
(2) Strategy. The alteration of U.S. war
plans through changes in targeting requirements and a revision
of the SIOP was made with a larger strategic purpose in mind.
During the initial stages of this phase the strategy was
essentially second strike counterforce. That is, in the event
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of war the U.S. strategy would have been to destroy Soviet
war-making capabilities (especially nuclear), while avoiding
cities and minimizing civilian casualties. Residual American
nuclear forces would in effect hold Soviet cities hostage and
allow for politically acceptable war termination for the U.S.
Thus, the emphasis was on maintaining survivable second-strike
(or retaliatory) U.S. nuclear forces. [71]
Amid various criticisms^ from all
sides, [72] McNamara's second-strike counterforce nuclear
strategy lost much of its credibility. As a result, the U.S.
nuclear strategy was transformed into one emphasizing two
specific missions for the strategic f orces--"assured-destruc-
tion" and "damage limitation." The essence of these two
missions was articulated by McNamara in 1964:
. . . to deter deliberate nuclear attack upon the
United States and its allies by maintaining a highly
reliable ability to inflict an unacceptable degree of
damage upon any single aggressor, or combination of
aggressors, even after absorbing a surprise first
strike. ... to limit damage to our population and
industrial capacity .[ 73
]
For McNamara and many of his critics, the
most important aspect of the assured-destruction strategy was
that it provided planners with some index for sizing the
strategic force structure [ 74 ] . Nevertheless, debates on the
feasibility and credibility of U.S. nuclear strategy, espe-
3. These criticisms and especially the various constraints and
percieved threats are discussed in greater detail in the summary
to this section.
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cially damage limitation, continued throughout this period,
while the Soviet nuclear threat grew increasingly
stronger [ 75 ] . Finally, in 1968 McNamara adopted a new revi-
sion of the assured-destruction strategy and announced the
inevitability of a strategy of "mutual deterrence" or "mutual
assured destruct ion . " [ 76 ] This strategy was essentially "a
form of ^parity' in which both sides maintained secure, sec-
ond-strike, assured-destruction forces. "[77] Even with these
debates and apparent changes in strategy, however, there is
little evidence that U.S. war plans varied between 1962 and
1974. Indeed, the second-strike counterforce strategy contin-
ued to guide U.S. war plans throughout this period[78].
As concerns declaratory strategic policy,
this period produced several statements all centered around
counterforce targeting. During the Kennedy years massive
retaliation was abandoned and replaced by a policy of "assured
destruction." Secretary McNamara revised this policy somewhat
into one of "mutual assured destruction" during the Johnson
Administration. Finally, President Nixon announced the policy
of "strategic sufficiency" at the start of his tenure in the
White House. [79]
c. 1974-1980: Limited Nuclear Options And
Counter -Recovery Targeting
(1) Targeting. The evolution of U.S. nuclear
strategy continued during the Ford Administration as changes,
however subtle, were introduced to the planning process.
These changes were mostly a continuation of the effort to
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provide greater flexibility in the nuclear war-fighting plans.
Specifically, targeting options were expanded so that portions
of a target list could be executed without launching an all-
out nuclear attack[80]. While providing expanded options,
however, these changes did not significantly alter U.S. war
plans as targeting continued to focus primarily on Soviet
military (especially nuclear) installations [ 81 ]
.
(2) Strategy. The previous period was charac-
terized by an increasing divergence between declaratory policy
and actual employment plans as explained by Henry Rowen:
The primary purpose of the Assured Destruction capa-
bilities doctrine was to provide a metric for deciding
how much force was enough: it provided a basis for de-
nying service and Congressional claims for more money
for strategic forces. . . . However, it was never pro-
posed by McNamara or his staff that nuclear weapons
actually be used in this way. [82]
The point is that U.S. forces had the capability of completely
destroying the relatively few targets (both urban-industrial
and military) in the Soviet Union. Thus, small attack options
aimed primarily at counterforce targets made sense. This
began to change by the early 1970s, however, as the Soviet
strategic nuclear arsenal was becoming larger and increasingly
less vulnerable while U.S. nuclear forces leveled off [83].
Realizing these changes, the Nixon Administration conducted a
series of studies to determine future U.S. military require-




The new strategy, announced by Secretary
of Defense James Schlesinger in January 1974, was designed to
specifically address changes in the strategic balance and the
resulting consequences of those changes. In particular, the
growth of Soviet nuclear capability in combination with con-
straints on American forces (budgetary and arms control) had
essentially nullified existing U.S. war plans. The U.S. could
no longer be assured of disarming the Soviet Union nor limit-
ing damage to itself in an all-out nuclear war. In response
to this imbalance, Schlesinger sought to once again introduce
greater flexibility into existing war plans and provide for
some control of nuclear escalation should deterrence fail.
The resulting Schlesinger strategy introduced expanded but
smaller attack options, known as limited nuclear options
(LNOs), to increase the deterrent credibility of U.S. strate-
gic forces and facilitate escalation control. [85]
In January 1977, new Secretary of Defense
Donald Rumsfeld announced a further change in U.S. nuclear
strategy. His "assured-retaliation" mission emphasized tar-
geting Soviet military, political, and economic assets to
impede the USSR's recovery from nuclear war [86]. Aaron Fried-
berg sums up the 1977 declared U.S. nuclear war strategy:
- . . in the event deterrence failed the primary U.S.
objective was to control the process of escalation,
bringing hostilities to an acceptable close at the low-
est level of conflict possible, thereby limiting damage
to the United States and its allies. If necessary, .
escalation control and thus damage limitation were to
be achieved through the use of limited nuclear options.
These options would serve both a military and a politi-
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cal purpose. If escalation control failed, the United
States would seek to destroy the USSR's recovery in the
postwar period. Such attacks would also be designed to
limit the Soviet Union's ability to retard U.S. recov-
ery. [87]
According to Ben Plymale, the actual U.S.
declaratory policy was announced in somewhat different terms
than already presented. Specifically, Plymale notes, Schles-
inger announced a policy of "Essential Equivalence" in 1974
based on four criteria: survivable second-strike reserves;
symmetry in ability to threaten; balance in counterforce
options; and perceived equality in offensive forces[88].
Moreover, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld announced a U.S.
policy of "Rough Equivalence" in 1976 based on similar crite-
ria. According to Plymale again, however, Rumsfeld's policy
was more a call to reverse the trends in the strategic bal-
ance, where the U.S.'s position was growing increasingly
inferior! 89 ]
.
The final changes in the U.S. nuclear
strategy that occurred during this period were undertaken by
the Carter Administration. This began in the summer of 1977
with a review of U.S. nuclear targeting policy and ended with
Presidential Directive 59 announcing the "countervailing
strategy" in 1980(90]. This strategy was only slightly modi-
fied by the Reagan Administration and heavily influences U.S.
nuclear strategy today. For that reason, the countervailing
strategy as well as PD-59 and its successor, NSDD-13, will be
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examined in the next chapter's discussion of current U.S.
nuclear strategy.
d. Threats, Constraints, And Resources
This phase in the evolution of U.S. nuclear
strategy is characterized by various changes in doctrine,
targeting schemes, and declaratory policy. The strategy of
second-strike counterforce in combination with a declaratory
policy of assured destruction and damage limitation marked the
first stage of this period. This eventually gave way to the
idea of limited nuclear options and counter-recovery targeting
and the declaratory policies of strategic sufficiency, essen-
tial equivalence, and rough equivalence. While each of these
strategies and policies can be associated with different
Presidential Administrations, however, the bases for their
development remained the same. Specifically, each nuclear
strategy was formulated based on the perceived threat, the
existing technology (resources), and various domestic and
international constraints.
First, under the category of threats, the
Soviet Union, or, more specifically, the Soviet nuclear capa-
bility, greatly influenced the formulation of U.S. nuclear
strategy during this period. In fact, the Kennedy
Administration's decision to abandon the massive retaliation
strategy/policy for second strike counterforce was based
largely on this perception of threat. In particular, an all-
out nuclear attack could no longer be guaranteed to disable
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the growing Soviet nuclear force nor would it encourage Soviet
restraint in the event of war[91]. Moreover, concern for the
increasing vulnerability of U.S. strategic forces from an
expanding Soviet nuclear threat prompted Kennedy's decision to
strengthen U.S. second-strike, long-range nuclear forces[92].
The same is true with McNamara's announcement of mutual as-
sured destruction based on a "mutuality of interests" between
the United States and the Soviet Union[93].
Whether these perceptions of the Soviet threat
by the U.S. leadership were valid or not is irrelevant. More
important is the effect they had on the formulation of U.S.
nuclear strategy. To be sure, by the early 1970s the expan-
sion of the Soviet nuclear capability had begun to change U.S.
strategic thinking and led Schlesinger to consider the limited
nuclear options approach. Quoting from The Military Balance
1977-78, Aaron Friedberg supports this threatening Soviet
nuclear buildup:
In 1966 the Soviets began to deploy large numbers of
ICBMs in hardened underground silos. Between 1966 and
1970 the size of their land-based missile force grew by
l,007--from 292 to 1,299 ICBM launchers. During this
same period the Russian navy deployed twenty new bal-
listic missile submarines, increasing the number of
submarine launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs) in its
force from 107 to 304. [94]
Second, resources, mostly in the form of nucle-
ar weapons technology, affected the development of U.S. nucle-
ar strategy as well. Again, the Kennedy buildup of U.S.
second-strike, long-range nuclear forces "helped to provide a
technological basis for a strategy other than a massive nucle-
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ar response ."[ 95 ] Later, resources became more of a con-
straint (i.e. technological limitation) or obstacle to the
implementation of Schlesinger ' s limited nuclear options
strategy[96]
.
Finally, in the area of constraints, several
factors combined to affect U.S. nuclear strategy formulation
from the early 1960s through the 1970s. McNamara's shift from
second-strike counterforce to assured destruction, for exam-
ple, was heavily influenced by overwhelming Congressional
criticisms as well as bureaucratic and budgetary con-
straints [ 97 ] . One specific Congressional criticism was the
Department of Defense's promotion of active and civil de-
fenses. Therefore, because these defenses could not be sold
to Congress, the more indirect method of holding the
adversary's cities hostage was adopted for the strategy of
damage 1 imitation [ 98 ] . Another example is the internal debate
over strategic force size, which resulted in the various
shifts in declaratory policy between 1963 and 1968 and led
McNamara to adopt assured destruction [ 99 ] . Finally, interna-
tional events such as the Vietnam War and the Strategic Arms
Limitation Talks (SALT) also constrained the development of
nuclear strategy during this period[100].
4. Conclusion
This chapter examined the evolution of U.S. declara-
tory strategic policy from the end of world war II through the
decade of the 1970s. Moreover, it included the critical
38
shifts in doctrine which were fundamental to strategic policy
formulation. The purpose of this section of the study has
been to relate the changes in nuclear strategy to those fac-
tors which were essential for its development. More impor-
tantly, the aim has been to demonstrate that the creation of a
nuclear strategy for any given scenario must start by consid-
ering elements within the broad categories of threats, con-
straints, and resources. The next step is to examine current
U.S. nuclear strategies focusing on the same categories. In
addition, the following section of this study will present one
practical application or implementation of the U.S. nuclear
strategy by examining the Navy's Maritime Strategy.
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IV. CURRENT U.S. STRATEGIES
A. INTRODUCTION
This section of the study will essentially continue the
examination of the evolution of U.S. nuclear strategy by
focusing on current developments. Specifically, those strate-
gies (PD-59 and NSDD-13) developed during the time period 1980
to 1987 will be presented with implications for future U.S.
nuclear strategy.'* Moreover, these particular strategies will
be examined from, again, the perspective of threats, con-
straints, and resources. The intention here is to further
demonstrate that developments in U.S. nuclear strategy can be
explained by changes in the environment. This kind of exami-
nation is, therefore, useful to the military strategic planner
who attempts to develop long-range strategies based, in part,
on changes in the international security environment.
Finally, the Navy's Maritime Strategy will be examined in
this section in an attempt to demonstrate the relevance of
U.S. nuclear strategy. That is, the application or implemen-
tation of the U.S. nuclear strategy will be demonstrated by
examining one specific service's role within the overall
national nuclear strategy. In addition, the Maritime Strategy
will be examined not only from a nuclear perspective but, once
4. All references to these official documents (i.e. PD-59, NSDD-
13, etc.) are to the unclassified public descriptions, not the
actual documents themselves.
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again, within the categories of threats, constraints, and
resources
.
B. NUCLEAR STRATEGIES OF THE 1980s
1. PD-59: The Countervailing Strategy
a. Introduction
The events leading up to the signing of Presi-
dential Directive No. 59 (PD-59) began shortly after President
Carter had entered the White House. In reality, according to
many noted scholars, the origins of the "countervailing
strategy" can be traced much earlier as it was simply part of
the evolution of U.S. nuclear strategy[ 101 ] . More important
here, however, are the specific events that directly led to
the development of PD-59.
In the summer of 1977, President Carter signed
Presidential Directive 18 as part of his administration's
overall review of U.S. defense policy. Specifically, "PD-18
directed the initiation of three studies concerning strategic
matters--an ICBM Force Modernization Study, a study on the
maintenance of a Secure Reserve Force and a Nuclear Targeting
Policy Review. "[ 102 ] What followed was an extensive examina-
tion of U.S. nuclear forces and capabilities, including tar-
geting and war plans, as well as an analysis of similar Soviet
nuclear capabilities and vulnerabilities. At the completion
of this study and its review by the President in late 1978,
the Department of Defense moved immediately toward a revision
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of U.S. nuclear strategy. The end result was the articulation
of the countervailing strategy which provided new guidance on
nuclear war planning, targeting, force structure requirements
and associated research and development programs. In short,
it set forth new principles in nuclear strategy established
during the administration's review of U.S. defense
policy[103]
.
Briefly, PD-59, entitled "Nuclear Weapons
Employment Policy," changed U.S. nuclear strategy in two basic
ways. First, in targeting, emphasis shifted from economic
recovery assets to primarily Soviet military and political
targets. This was clearly a change in targeting focus from
that mandated by the Schlesinger Doctrine (NSDM-242). Second,
and perhaps more importantly, PD-59 formulated new plans and
capabilities for the possibility of fighting a protracted
nuclear conflict [ 104 ] . Again, the reasons for these changes
in U.S. nuclear strategy are better understood by examining
the development of PD-59 from the perspective of threats,
constraints, and resources.
b. Threats, Constraints, And Resources
In the area of threats, "there was an extensive
survey of Soviet nuclear doctrine and plans, including recent
developments in their defensive programs ."[ 105 ] Part of the
PD-18 studies, this examination revealed the Soviet belief in
and preparations for victory in nuclear war and the possibili-
ty that such a conflict might be protracted. According to
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Leon Sloss and Marc Dean Millot, the "acknowledgement of these
Soviet views at senior levels of the U.S. government had a
profound influence on the strategy that ultimately emerged in
PD-59."[106] There was little doubt in earlier U.S. strategic
nuclear formulations that the Soviet Union was the primary
threat to U.S. security. Yet, for the first time with PD-59,
the development of U.S. nuclear strategy focused primarily on
Soviet views of nuclear war and the "subjective" side of the
deterrent equat ion [ 107 ]
.
In addition to the survey of Soviet doctrine
and plans, however, it was the USSR's growing nuclear capabil-
ity that led the Carter Administration to reassess the U.S.
nuclear strategy. Scott Sagan notes some of these disturbing
trends in the overall military balance:
Despite its adherence to the 1972 ABM Treaty restric-
tions on active ballistic missile defense, the Soviet
Union was continuing vigorous strategic defensive pro-
grams in air defense against U.S. bombers and in civil
defense leadership-sheltering capabilities. Soviet
offensive improvements had also continued despite the
SALT process. Most important, the huge Soviet MIRVed-
ICBM force was rapidly achieving sufficient accuracy
to threaten a large portion of the American Minuteman
ICBMs. [108]
Similar concerns about the growing Soviet
strategic force posture were raised in the 1980 Hearing On
Presidential Directive 59 Before The U.S. Senate Committee On
Foreign Relations:
The Soviet force developments that have occurred over
the last 10 years or so, which include the deployment
of MIRVed ICBM's of high accuracy and MIRVed SLBM's, '
the latter of which provide them with an enduring, sur-
vivable strategic offensive capability . . . have
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brought Soviet strategic nuclear forces to a position
of clear parity with the United States, and in one im-
portant area, ICBM vulnerability, have posed a severe
challenge to the survivability of a part of the U.S.
deterrent force. [109]
As alluded to earlier in this study, the cate-
gories of threats, constraints, and resources are closely
linked in the development of U.S. nuclear strategy. The same
holds true with the formulation of the countervailing strategy
as articulated in PD-59. Specifically, the PD-18 studies
revealed as many shortcomings in U.S. nuclear strategy and
force structure as revelations about Soviet nuclear doctrine,
war plans, and preparations. Moreover, many of the deficien-
cies that were revealed served as constraints in the develop-
ment of the U.S. response. For example, after analyzing
Soviet nuclear capabilities, U.S. strategists concluded that
American C^l was clearly inadequate to meet wartime objec-
tives, especially in a protracted conf lict [ 110 ] . This is not
the first time, nor will it be the last, that U.S. nuclear
strategy was constrained by technological capabilities. In
fact, according to William Baugh, "in both its technical and
its political aspects, strategic doctrine is constrained by
the available technology, and lies at the interface of tech-
nology and politics ."[ Ill] The point here though is that from
an analysis of the threat, inadequacies in U.S. resources were
revealed which served to constrain American nuclear strategy.
Other constraints were perhaps more subtle but
important nevertheless in the development of the PD-59 nuclear
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strategy. First, arms control agreements, especially the SALT
II treaty, imposed constraints on the nuclear force structure
which in turn restricted the flexibility of U.S. strategic
plans[112]. Second, the development of the countervailing
strategy was constrained by the criticisms of U.S. allies who
demanded it be consistent with NATO's flexible response
strategy! 113 ] . Third, as always, short- and long-term budge-
tary concerns at least initially restricted the development of
weapons systems/programs that were eventually called for in
PD-59[114]. Finally, the development of PD-59 was constrained
by the perceptions (and mispercept ions ) of the national lead-
ers charged with determining the most credible and effective
strategy for the U.S. [115].
Under the category of resources, again, the
studies associated with PD-18 revealed important deficiencies
in U.S. nuclear forces. Obviously, the growth in the Soviet
nuclear arsenal and the increased hardness of its ICBM
force[116] were largely responsible for these newly recognized
inadequacies. Still, limitations in such areas as CI and
counterforce targeting hindered the flexibility of U.S. nucle-
ar strategy! 117 ] . As a result, actions were taken by the
Carter Administration to initiate programs deemed essential to
PD-59's requirements. Presidential Directives 53 (promoting
enhanced telecommunications facilities) and 58 (advocating
protection of national leadership and vital communications
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equipment and improvements of early warning systems) were
examples of such programs [ 118 ]
.
While PD-59 itself initiated subsequent im-
provements in nuclear foxces and associated programs, however,
prior U.S. technological developments (resources) actually
helped formulate the countervailing strategy. For example,
developments such as the sophisticated NS-20 on-board computer
system[119] and the technologically advanced M)cl2A reentry
vehicle allowed for increased accuracies and true hard-target
kill capabi 1 i ties [ 120 ] . Moreover, according to Deborah Shap-
ley, these developments resulted in "a technologically driven
increase in the role allocated to precision counterforce
strikes, closely associated with the rise of flexible target-
ing and countervailing doctrines . . . ."[121]
2. NSDD-13 And The Reagan Strategic Modernization
Program
a. Introduction
During the first years of the Reagan Adminis-
tration there was little evidence of any change in U.S. nucle-
ar strategy. In fact, by most accounts. President Reagan was
initially interested only in continuing the development of the
previous Administration's countervailing strategy. According
to Colin Gray, "the Reagan administration's issuance of the
policy guidance document NSDD-13 in October 1981 was an en-
dorsement and refinement of the ideas outlined in President
Carter's PD-59 of July 1980 . . . ."[122] This is hardly sur-
prising considering the short amount of time elapsed between
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the signing of these two Presidential Directives. As a re-
sult, both environments for this time period were character-
ized by essentially the same elements of threats, constraints,
and resources. Still, Reagan's immediate focus, and later the
motivation behind his strategic modernization program, was the
acquisition of the nuclear capabilities to implement the
countervailing strategy(123 ]
.
b. Threats, Constraints, And Resources
The Soviet Union obviously remained the primary
threat to U.S. interests and, as such, provided the impetus
for the development of both NSDD-13 and the strategic moderni-
zation program. Leon Sloss and Marc Dean Millot discuss the
Soviet threat as one of the major factors that prompted the
evolution in U.S. nuclear strategy culminating in NSDD-13.
They vr ite
:
In addition to the intense pursuit of counterforce
capabilities in their offensive forces, the expansion
of Soviet air defense, their extensive passive defense
programs, including civil defense, their continued
large R&D efforts in ABM and the development of a
Soviet anti-satellite capability bore convincing testi-
mony that the Soviets were doing their best to prepare
to defeat an enemy militarily and survive as a national
entity in the event of nuclear war. [124]
Even shortly after the signing of NSDD-13, almost as if to
justify the development of U.S. nuclear strategy. President
Reagan remarked about the Soviet threat: "The truth of the
matter is that on balance the Soviet Union does have a defi-
nite margin of super ior ity. "[ 125
]
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Many of the same constraints that affected
previous U.S. nuclear strategies also restricted development
during this period. Among the most important were arms con-
trol agreements, budgetary restrictions, technological limita-
tions, allied consensus, and public opinion. SALT II and the
ABM treaty and negotiations for further nuclear weapons limi-
tations (i.e. START and INF), for example, apparently re-
stricted force structure development, and, thus, strategy
implementation. Critics point out, however, that it was more
the U.S. approach to arms control than the restrictions them-
selves that constrained the Reagan Administration's nuclear
strategy. For example, Colin Gray writes:
The Reagan administration attempted in 1981 to
pursue the strategically rational course of charting
and funding its defense program before it committed
itself to the arms control negotiating fray. This
approach was a domestic and inter-Allied political
failure of no small dimension or importance. In
practice, notwithstanding the inherent merit of its
approach, the administration forfeited the moral high
ground of being seen to care about arms control--and
ipso facto to many people, about peace. When the
administration made dramatic and ambitious bids for
public confidence by means of attention-seizing pro-
posals for disarmament in intermediate-range nuclear
forces (INF) and then in the Strategic Arms Reduction
Talks (START), those bids looked as though they had
been prompted by a concern to respond to public
disquiet. Inevitably, some of the credit the adminis-
tration might have expected to receive for such visible
(and genuine) evidence of commitment to arms reduction
was forfeited because of the widespread belief that the
timing and the character of the proposals advanced were
dictated more by a felt need to appease domestic and





Moreover, writing about the ABM Treaty in 1981, Michael Nacht
notes: "The Reagan Administration would suffer severe domes-
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tic and international criticism if it terminated the treaty,
except under the most compelling of circumstances ."[ 127
]
Another example illustrates the domestic con-
straints that have affected U.S. nuclear strategy throughout
its evolution. This is the case of the MX missile originally
announced by Carter, supported by Reagan, then delayed pri-
marily due to domestic opposition. William Baugh sums up this
example of the "political cycling of strategic weapons expend-
itures" :
Originally announced by President Carter, partly as a
domestic bargaining chip to gain Senate ratification of
SALT II, MX deployment was strongly supported by Presi-
dent Reagan both before and after the 1980 election.
Yet by the fall of 1981, faced with strong opposition
to MX deployment in Utah and Nevada and with a desire
to limit defense spending increases in hopes of balanc-
ing the federal budget by 1984, the Reagan administra-
tion was seriously considering proposals to reduce MX
deployment to perhaps half the missiles and one fourth
the number of shelters originally planned .[ 128
]
Lastly, the issue of ethics and morality with
regard to nuclear weapons, deterrence, the arms buildup, etc.
became a highly publicized and much debated topic during the
Reagan administrat ion[ 129 ] . While the ethical issues raised
against nuclear weapons were often supported by inconsistent
arguments, [ 130 ] their validity was less important than the
public support they could raise. Still, the morality and
ethics of nuclear arms were often discussed by noted scholars
and statesmen [ 131 ] , particularly when advocating such options
as "nuclear freeze" and "no first use. "[132] Nor were debates
on these and related issues confined to the United States as
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similar discussions prevailed among U.S. allies in Europe
during this time period[133]. Again, these issues merely
highlighted the important role of public opinion and other
domestic and international constraints in the development of
U.S. nuclear strategy.
Finally, the influence of resources was inti-
mately linked to the development of U.S. nuclear strategy
during the Reagan administration. As many critics note, [134]
however, it was often difficult to distinguish which came
first, the weapons or the strategy. That criticism is cer-
tainly not new to the Defense Department, yet there is some
validity to the statement that the development of strategy
largely depends on the available resources. Moreover, as
previously noted, there is clear evidence that NSDD-13 and the
strategic modernization program were developed to establish
the resources required by PD-59 and the countervailing strate-
gy[135]. Thus, weapons acquisition and R&D programs were
designed to improve all three legs of the nuclear triad and
associated C-^I systems as well as develop strategic defensive
capabilities. Specifically, these programs included the
development and modernization of the B-1 bomber, the MX ICBM,
and the Trident II (D-5) SLBM[1361. Moreover, they included
new emphasis on ballistic missile defense as note during
President Reagan's March 23, 1983 speech on the Strategic
Defense Initiative (SDI)tl37].
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Resources are clearly fundamental to the devel-
opment and implementation of U.S. nuclear strategy. Moreover,
there is little question that resources were central to the
development and credibility of NSDD-13 and the strategic
modernization program. Still, resources or the process to
establish more and better resources also often serves to
constrain nuclear strategy development. As Senate Armed
Services Committee Chairman Sam Nunn writes:
We lack the budgetary and manpower resources to do
everything we now wish to do simultaneously. Two years
ago, the Reagan administration announced a program to
modernize most of our strategic nuclear forces; increase
and modernize our conventional force structure; build a
600-ship navy; and improve readiness, sustainability,
and military pay across the board. It is now obvious
that the Reagan program cannot be fully implemented .[ 138
]
Table 2 below summarizes these recent developments in
U.S. nuclear strategy that were presented in this section of
the study. In particular, it correlates the strategies with
the specific threats, constraints, and resources that were
critical to their development.
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C. THE MARITIME STRATEGY
1. Introduction
Again, the purpose of this section is to demonstrate
the application of the overall national military strategy by
focusing on the roles and missions of one particular armed
service. It is here that actual employment and deployment of
nuclear weapons can be discussed as part of an armed force's
military strategy. Moreover, the examination of one services'
military strategy from the perspective of threats, con-
straints, and resources will highlight its similarities to the
national military strategy. The Navy was chosen as the serv-
ice to investigate because of the author's familiarity with
this branch of the U.S. armed forces. In addition, the Navy's
Maritime Strategy offers for this study a specific and unique
example for analyzing the development of strategy. Since this
study is specifically about nuclear strategic planning, that
area within the Maritime Strategy will be discussed with
implications for the future.
The Maritime Strategy was formally articulated for
the first time in the early 1980s. ^ This is not to say that
the navy lacked earlier strategies to support U.S. national
interests, nor should it suggest that the "maritime strategy"
5. The first official version of The Maritime Strategy was
published as a classified document within the Navy, Opnav 60 P-1-
84, in May 1984. An unclassified version followed in January
1986 written by the CNO, Admiral James D. Watkins, and published
as a special supplement to the U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings
under the title "The Maritime Strategy."
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was a novel concept [ 139 ] . More accurately, this official
declaratory statement was the culmination of an historical
evolution of U.S. naval thought and practice in peacetime and
during war[140]. Yet, if anything, this codification of the
U.S. Maritime Strategy increased the already frequent debates
over the Navy's proper role in the national military strate-
gy[141]. Nevertheless, the evolution and development of the
Maritime Strategy is similar to that of the U.S. nuclear
strategy presented earlier when viewed from the perspective of
threats, constraints, and resources. Once again, this kind of
analysis for developing long-range strategies is not new to
the U.S. Navy[142] .^
It is useful at this time to discuss briefly the
definition and major objectives of the Maritime Strategy. In
the words of Admiral James D. Watkins:
Maritime Strategy is derived from national military
strategy and is an integral component of that strategy.
The purpose of our strategy is deterrence; should deter-
rence fail our strategy relies on forward defense and
allied cooperation to bring about war termination on
terms favorable to ourselves and our allies. [143]
Since the Maritime Strategy is simply the maritime
component of the National Military Strategy, it is useful to
define the latter as well. Again quoting Admiral Watkins:
6. By analyzing current trends, the study in Ref. [142] sought to
identify environmental factors which might impact on the Navy in
the 1972-1985 time frame. The five environments considered were:
international, sociological, corporate, technological, and mili-
tary.
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Our national military strategy is designed: to
preserve this country's political identity, framework,
and institutions; to protect the United States, includ-
ing its foreign assets and allies; to foster the
country's economic well-being; and to bolster an inter-
national order supportive of the vital interests of
this country and its allies. [144]
Therefore, the maritime strategy is specifically
designed to support the three elements upon which the national
strategy is founded: deterrence, forward defense, and al-
liance solidarity. Moreover, it is a global strategy that
supports the national interests in a wide range of contingen-
cies from peacetime through general nuclear war. As a result,
its components include peacetime presence, crisis response,
warfighting, and war termination. The warfighting component
is further subdivided into three phases: deterrence or the
transition to war; seizing the initiative; and carrying the
fight to the enemy[145]. The next section examines the devel-
opment of the Maritime Strategy as a function of threats,
constraints, and resources.
2. Threats, Constraints, Resources
John Hattendorf writes about the importance of
threats to the evolution of thought that eventually became the
Maritime Strategy:
Any serious thinking about strategy must necessar-
ily deal with the effect that one's forces will have on
an opponent. How an enemy will use his forces is a
critical factor in any strategic evaluation. Thus,
when determining how forces might be deployed for
achieving broad future goals in a war, one must also
assess the probability of how an enemy might act and
react. One must examine everything that an enemy can






Along those lines, there is little question that the Soviet
Union was considered the only major threat to the U.S. Navy
during the formulation of the Maritime Strategy. Captain T.
M. Daly, USN writes about the importance of the Soviet Union
to the development of the Maritime Strategy:
Because the Maritime Strategy is designed to deny the
Soviet Union its preferred strategy, continued accurate
knowledge of Moscow's strategy is central, especially
during a period in which new major weapons systems--such
as long range, land-attack cruise missiles--are coming
on line. For this reason, any evidence of shifting
priorities in Soviet naval strategy is central to
maintaining the Maritime Strategy's focus and keeping it
at the cutting edge. [147]
The growth of the Soviet Navy from the early
1960s[148] toward developing a blue-water fleet' only in-
creased the American perception of the USSR threat[1493.
Specifically, Americans worried that the growing sea-denial
capabilities of the Soviet Navy "could deprive the West of the
free use of the sea, thereby creating political, economic, and
military disaster ."[ 150 ] As a result, during the early stages
in the development of the Maritime Strategy, many in the U.S.
"viewed the Soviet naval capability by mirror- imaging and
refighting World War II. "[151] This perception began to
change in the late 1960s, however, as Soviet specialists in
the U.S. began to emphasize the traditionally defensive nature
7. The definition of "blue-water fleet" is open to much inter-
pretation. Some date this achievement by the Soviet Navy as
early as the late 1960s, while others believe the Soviets still
do not have a true blue water fleet today.
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of Soviet naval strategyt 152 ] . While this perception did not
immediately prevail within the U.S. Navy, it was increasingly
supported by the naval intelligence and Center for Naval
Analyses communities. Moreover, the acceptance of these new
views about the Soviet threat was central to the formulation
of the U.S. Maritime Strategy in the late 1970s and early
1980stl53] .
One last change in the way U.S. naval strategists
viewed the Soviet threat was similar to that which occurred
during the formulation of U.S. nuclear strategy in PD-59. In
particular, beginning with Admiral Hayward's appointment as
Chief of Naval Operations in June 1978, naval strategists
began to study in depth the nature of the Soviet threat(154].
Admiral Watkins (Hayward's successor as CNO) continued this
emphasis on better understanding of the Soviet threat in his
effort to develop a formal statement of the Maritime Strategy.
As one of the four key elements in his thoughts on the Mari-
time Strategy, Admiral Watkins mentioned "the effort to devel-
op a better understanding of the Soviet thought processes and
inherent strengths and weaknesses in order to counter and
exploit them. "[155]
The constraints in the development of the Maritime
Strategy, while mostly domestic in nature, were also not
completely novel. Moreover, some of the variations in specif-
ic constraints were directly related to national leadership
changes. For example, during the 1960s and 1970s although the
58
official DoD statement on naval missions remained constant,
the long-term force structure goals changed with each new
Secretary of Def ense [ 156 ] . This was especially true during
the Carter years when his emphasis on the European central
front conflicted with the Navy's global-oriented force struc-
ture designed for superiority over the Soviets [ 157 ] .
In the 1970s most of the constraints involved de-
bates on the Navy's budget. Unfortunately, many confused the
debates on unit costs and program alternatives with strategy
which led some critics to charge that unrealistic naval
strategies were created to justify large building pro-
grams[158]. Moreover, this confusion led Admiral Hayward to
state: "This is why academics and others say the Navy doesn't
have a strategy. " t 159 ] Typical bureaucratic problems within
the Navy Department also constrained the development of
strategy during this period. Mostly, this involved the lack
of exchange of ideas between different departments, thus,
preventing commonly shared views from aiding the development
of naval thinking and strategy f ormulat ion [ 160 ]
.
Finally, three memoranda written by the Vice Chief
of Naval Operations, Admiral William N. Small, highlighted
what he considered to be fundamental constraints to naval
strategy development. Moreover, according to John Hattendorf,
these memoranda led directly to the formulation and later
publication of The Maritime Strategy[ 161 ] . First, Small ob-
served a disconnect between strategy and ship/weapons con-
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struction so that rather than strategy driving programs, the
reverse was true[162]. Secondly, Small believed that the
Navy's "worst-case mentality" in strategic thinking was detri-
mental to long-range planning and created a defensive rather
than an offensive outlook [ 163 ] . Lastly, Small saw parochial-
ism within the various naval service warfare specialties
rather than integrated analyses in strategic planning. He
believed this caused faulty analysis and created unrealistic
threats, prevented af f ordability from affecting program recom-
mendations, and resulted in inadequate combat systems [ 164 ]
.
Again, by focusing on critical constraints in naval strategic
thinking, these memoranda led directly to the formulation of
The Maritime Strategy.
The greatest effect the area of resources had on
the development of the Maritime Strategy was through the
establishment of organizations dedicated to naval strategic
thinking. Among these were the Long Range Planning Group (Op-
OOX) instituted in January 1980, and the Center for Naval
Warfare studies established at the Naval War College in April
1981. Also established at the Naval War College was a small
group of the Navy's "best and brightest" officers devoted to
naval strategic and tactical planning known as the CNO's
Strategic Studies Group. In a broad sense. Admiral Hayward's
purpose in creating these organizations was "to assist the
Navy's leaders in thinking about strategy ."[ 165 ] Specifically^
"the mission of Op-OOX was to assess resource limitations on
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future naval capabilities and to analyze alternative strate-
gies for achieving long-range goals" including "the interplay
between strategy and tact ics ."[ 166 ] Hattendorf explains
Admiral Hayvard's purpose in creating these other institu-
tions :
He wanted to create a core of future naval leaders who
would be well-versed in the role of naval forces in
national policy and strategy. He also wanted to re-
establish the Naval War College as the pinnacle for
education in naval strategic thinking .[ 167
]
Admiral Hayward was also interested in overcoming
the continual budget battle with Congress by focusing on
increasing the overall readiness posture of the Navy and not
worrying about force levels. Thus, "Hayward put his priority
on spare parts, ammunition, pay, and benefits," concentrated
on developing "a war-winning strategy," and emphasized
"strategic issues for a global maritime power. "[168] Admiral
Watkins continued this emphasis on better strategic thinking
in the Navy as he worked to develop a formal statement of the
Maritime Strategy. In a 7 October 1982 message to the Fleet
CINCs, he specifically mentioned those areas he considered
vital to the Navy's future. Among those were "war-fighting
readiness, the revitalization of the Naval War College as the
crucible for strategic and tactical thinking, integration of
the Naval Reserve into our war-fighting thinking, and improve-
ment of interservice cooperation and mutual
understanding. "tl6S]
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Again, these threats, constraints, and resources,
taken together, were instrumental in the development of the
Maritime Strategy. In particular, the emphasis on Soviet
missions and strategies, on increasing naval readiness, and on
thinking as a global maritime power led to the development of
the forward maritime strategy[ 170 ] . Yet, this kind of naval
strategic thinking did not end with the publication of The
Maritime Stzategy, nor did many of the debates that were
critical to its development [ 171 ] . Still, it did make naval
strategic planners more aware of the threats, constraints, and
resources that are fundamental to the strategy process. The
next section examines these issues in the nuclear application
of the Maritime Strategy.
Q
3. The Nuclear Maritime Strategy^
The Navy's use of nuclear weapons must be considered
essentially a subdivision or component of the broad Maritime
Strategy. Moreover, for this study, the nuclear aspect of the
Maritime Strategy is more applicable and provides greater
implications for future U.S. national nuclear strategies.
Yet, while deterrence and war termination are presented as
fundamental elements of the Maritime Strategy, [ 172 ] there is
8. Already adopted by land and air forces as applied to the NATO
strategy, forward defense was adapted by the Strategic Studies
Group for the Navy and ultimately transformed into the forward
maritime strategy.
9. Ref. [177] is one of the few unclassified sources that ad-
dresses the U.S. Navy's nuclear strategy within the context of
the overall Maritime Strategy.
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little discussion of actual employment of naval nuclear
forces. Still, in Admiral Watkins words, "Maritime Strategy
must consider the nuclear balance even during the conventional
phase of the war. "[173] Therefore, given that nuclear deter-
rence[174] and/or nuclear retal iat ion [ 175 ] are among the U.S.
Navy's broad missions, a naval nuclear strategy is worth
examinat ion[ 176 ] . More importantly, the Navy's nuclear weap-
ons capability must be examined from the same perspective of
threats, constraints, and resources.
Several issues can be discussed when examining the
U.S. Navy's nuclear weapons capabilities. For example, the
issue of nuclear war at sea merits serious consideration and
has been the subject of recent literature on naval strate-
gy[177]. Another issue that is becoming increasingly debated
especially in arms control discussions is the Navy's use of
sea-launched cruise missiles ( SLCMs ) . The remaining subjects
involve the Navy's strategic nuclear forces, especially more
recently the Trident SSBNs and the Trident II (D-5) SLBM.
While each of these subjects can be discussed in great detail,
it is beyond the scope of this study to do so. For purposes
of brevity and consistency, however, this study's examination
of naval nuclear forces will focus exclusively on the strate-
gic component.
In short, the Navy's ballistic missile submarines
(SSBNs) and associated submarine-launched ballistic missiles
(SLBMs) represent the sea leg of the U.S. strategic nuclear
63
triad. ^ Again, briefly, the role of this component within
the Maritime Strategy is first deterrence then war termina-
tion, both made credible by the threat of retaliation. In
order for that credibility to be maintained, the U.S. must
demonstrate the resolve and possess the forces to execute such
a nuclear strategy. Though interrelated, it is the latter
that will be discussed here in terms of threats, constraints,
and resources.
Since the Maritime Strategy is designed primarily to
counter the Soviet threat on a global scale, it is the USSR's
naval forces that are the greatest threat to U.S. SSBNs.
Classified as antisubmarine warfare (ASW), this three-dimen-
sional (air, surface, and sub-surface) threat is becoming
increasingly more capable [ 178 ] . It includes such new genera-
tion platforms as the TU-142 Bear-F and Ka-27 Helix A ASW
aircraft, Akula and Sierra nuclear-powered attack submarines,
and Kirov and Udaloy surface combatants [ 179 ] . These and other
late-generation platforms are being developed with more tech-
nologically advanced sensors and weapons systems, and, through
increased training exercises, are improving the Soviet fleet's
tactical ASW capabilities [ 180 ] . Moreover, research and devel-
opment in such areas as quieting, propulsion systems, fire
control, and communications adds potential to the increasingly
10. Although increasingly critics, especially from the Soviet
Union, charge that the U.S. Navy's SLCMs have a strategic as well
as tactical nuclear role.
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capable Soviet threat[181]. Thus, the U.S. superiority in ASW
that in the past has relied on advantages in technology and
training is becoming increasingly threatened by these Soviet
developments [18 2 ]
.
In addition to the advances in Soviet ASW, several
other constraints are important to the future development of
the U.S. Navy's strategic nuclear strategy. These include
many of the same kinds of economic and budgetary, technologi-
cal, and political constraints presented earlier. To begin
with, the SSBN relies on communicating with shore-based facil-
ities for everything from daily peacetime operations to retar-
geting instructions during wartime. Thus, limitations in the
flexibility of communications particularly during a conflict
are one handicap the SSBN presently suf f ers [ 183 ] . Another
potential technological constraint is only theoretical at
present but is more directly related once again to the Soviet
threat. This has to do with a potential breakthrough in ASW
that would make submarines more susceptible to detection.
While this kind of development has been talked about for
years, however, it remains improbable in the foreseeable
future[184]
.
Primarily because of their mobility, SSBNs are
considered the most "invulnerable" leg of the strategic nucle-
ar triad. Yet, two different but related constraints may
reduce this invulnerability in the future. First, arms con-
trol negotiations, especially the strategic arms reduction
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talks (START), could drastically limit the number of SSBNs, or
at least SLBMs, available as part of the triad[185]. Second-
ly, the U.S. program objective of 20 Trident submarines by
approximately the year 2000 is nearly a 50 percent reduction
in the current number of U.S. SSBNs[186]. Obviously, the
result of both of these events would be fewer SSBNs in the
U.S. arsenal. The fact that each Trident submarine carries
more missiles than previous classes (24 vs. 16) and will
eventually deploy the advanced Trident II (D-6) SLBM is not
the issue here. The point is that with the advances in Soviet
ASW technology and tactics including superior numbers of
forces, fewer U.S. SSBNs implies greater vulnerability for the
forces that do exist.
The U.S. Navy's future strategic nuclear arsenal
will not only consist of fewer SSBNs but it will have less
bases to homeport those ships[187]. Again, most of the advan-
tages and invulnerability the SSBN enjoys result from its
operational mobility. When the SSBN is in port, therefore, it
becomes as easily targeted as the ICBM and, thus, just as
vulnerable [188 ] . It follows then that fewer homeports further
increases the SSBN's vulnerability by reducing the adversary's
targeting problem.
Most of the remaining constraints are political in
nature including those involving economic or budgetary issues.
While much has been written about the high cost of weapons
systems, it remains a constraint in the development of naval
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nuclear strategy, especially as concerns force structure
procurement. Other related constraints include the interserv-
ice rivalry over what constitutes the best force mix for the
strategic nuclear triad, [189] and the uncertainty of escala-
tion control in nuclear war[190]. While each of these con-
straints are individually different, they are similar in
origin. That is, they essentially derive from the uncertainty
inherent in the entire subject of nuclear war. With one
exception, which is of little use today, the world has not
experienced the use of nuclear weapons in war. As a result,
the issue of nuclear war, and, hence, the development of
nuclear strategy is often reduced to theory, however accurate.
That, in itself, is probably the biggest constraint in the
development of any nuclear strategy, naval or otherwise.
Finally, in the area of resources, again, the Tri-
dent SSBN and the Trident II (D-5) SLBM represent the future
for the sea leg of the nuclear triad. The strategic moderni-
zation program initiated by the Reagan Administration assures
the continued development of these systems. According to the
FY 1989 Joint Military Net Assessment:
The modernization of the strategic SLBM force is con-
tinuing with the deployment of TRIDENT (Ohio-class)
ballistic missile submarines. When the TRIDENT D-5
missiles are added to the inventory, they will provide
a significant improvement in range, accuracy, and pay-
load to complement the survivability and endurance
inherent in SLBMs . These improvements will give the
SLBM leg of the Triad the capability to retaliate
against a full spectrum of targets, substantially in-
crease the size of the nuclear-powered ballistic
submarine patrol area, and provide an even greater
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hedge against a Soviet breakthrough in antisubmarine
warfare capability. Because of these new weapon system
programs, the SLBM force should be more capable against
a harder and more mobile Soviet target base. [191]
Moreover, in the words of Vice Admiral Daniel L. Cooper,
Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Undersea Warfare):
TRIDENT submarines provide the most effective strategic
platform in the world today and foreseeable future. It
is unsurpassed in the vital areas of survivability, re-
liability, responsiveness, flexibility, endurance, le-
thality, and connectivity. With the TRIDENT II (D-5)
missile, it will be the most capable and cost effective
strategic weapon system in the U.S. arsenal. . . . The
TRIDENT weapons system is the keystone to our nation's
strategic deterrence. It is a proven, mobile weapon
delivery system which assures, most importantly, survi-
vability, along with accuracy, and dependability and
must continue as the most critical element to our na-
tion's strategic force modernization program. [ 192 ]
Aside from these obviously positive remarks, it
appears extremely likely that the Trident SSBN and the Trident
(D-5) SLBM represent the Navy's long-range (future) strategic
nuclear weapons systems. From the perspective of resources,
therefore, the development of a naval nuclear strategy is
simplified somewhat by the reduced uncertainty in the avail-
able forces (resources).
D. CONCLUSION
This chapter has presented the most recent statements of
U.S. nuclear strategy as well as one armed services' declared
military strategy with nuclear implications. The purpose in
this examination of current U.S. strategies has been twofold.
First, each of these strategies have developed as a function
of threats, constraints, and resources. This formulation will
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be useful in forecasting future strategies, the focus of the
remainder of this study. Second, the examination of current
U.S. nuclear strategies establishes the base point for the
direction of strategy development for the future. Again, this
is useful for the military strategic planner attempting to
develop long-range U.S. nuclear strategies. Specifically, by
analyzing current strategies and adapting them as necessary to
fit predicted changes in the future security environment,
planners are better able to develop long-range strategies.
Later in this study this kind of analysis will be used to
develop the "best" or "ideal" U.S. nuclear strategies for
alternative future world scenarios. The next chapter presents
the specific scenarios that will be used to postulate the
future U.S. nuclear strategies.
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V. ALTERNATIVE WORLD SCENARIOS FOR STRATEGIC PLANNING
A. INTRODUCTION
As the focus of this study is long-range strategic plan-
ning, this section will examine the future security environ-
ment through alternative world scenarios. Specifically, four
scenarios from Charles W. Taylor's Alternative Ji^orld Scenarios
For Strategic Planning will be presented as probable environ-
ments for the long-range (i.e. 20-30 years) future. It is
important to remember that forecasting involves uncertainty
and, by exploring probable futures, alternative scenarios
provide only a means of reducing that uncertainty. Thus,
while a set of alternative futures scenarios taken together
might encompass the "most probable" future, no one scenario is
likely to describe the future that will actually occur[193].
Nevertheless, the alternative futures methodology is useful in
describing the future security environment for the strategic
planner interested in developing a long-range military strate-
gy for the United States.
Several scholarly studies have examined the long-range
future security environment for the purpose of presenting
alternative military strategies for the United Statestl94].
Taylor's book was chosen for this study because its conclu-
sions about the future environment closely approximate those
of other contemporary works. Moreover, this particular book
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has been critically examined by selected scholars who conclud-
ed that its methodology and scenario outlines are sound and
plausible[195]
.
One of the most dif-ficult tasks in using the alternative
futures methodology is the actual creation of the scenarios.
Utilizing Taylor's book for this study, therefore, eliminates
the process of developing plausible alternative futures.
Moreover, while Taylor discusses the methodology used in
developing his scenarios, it is assumed valid as already
indicated, and, therefore, will not be examined in any detail
here
.
Finally, Taylor's book is specifically designed to ad-
dress long-range strategic planning for the Department of the
Army, and, thus, postulates a future Army force structure for
each scenario. Nevertheless, it is the specific scenarios
themselves rather than the emphasis that are important to this
study. Moreover, the critics of the book concluded that its
"utility can be extended to other areas of long-range military
planning. "[ 196 ] Thus, the utility of Taylor's book for this
study is its examination of plausible scenarios for the future
security environment. More importantly, from its scenarios
will be derived those elements within the categories of
threats, constraints, and resources useful in the formulation
of nuclear strategy. The next step will be to develop a U.S.
nuclear strategy that will fit into each future scenario.
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B. THE EARLY DECADES OF THE 21st CENTURY
1. Introduction
By focusing on the years 2005 and 2020, Taylor's
four scenarios provide a useful framework for midrange to
long-range military strategic planning. Moreover, these
particular time periods were chosen to relate current underly-
ing conditions for policymaking and decisionmaking to the
early decades of the 21st century. In this way, the scenarios
"provide a background for planning alternative strategic
courses of action and assessing defense policies as well as
provide a framework for exploring long-term defense require-
ments. "[197]
This section of the study will briefly present the
assumptions and trends central to the four alternative world
scenarios in Taylor's book. In addition, it will highlight
those trends (later defined as "scenario drivers") that are
critical to national and international issues for the United
States. Finally, there will be a brief discussion of the key
attributes or variables that are used to distinguish one
scenario from another.
2. Assumptions
Any study's conclusions are based on a given set of
conditions or assumptions that serve to limit its scope.
Therefore, assumptions are useful not only in restricting a
study to certain sets of conditions, but also in preventing
highly unexpected or catastrophic events from invalidating its
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results. The assumptions used in Taylor's study are purposely
broad yet designed to support the trends and events that are
central to a stable world environment in each scenario. They
include
:
no general (i.e. world or major) wars, nor a war
between the U.S. and USSR or among other major
powers will occur
— neither a worldwide economic collapse nor major
world depression will occur during the next 30 years
no major scientific or technological breakthrough
will occur that will give one world nation the ulti-
mate power of intimidation over all others[198]
3. Trends
Forecasting of any kind, especially that associated
with creating alternative future environments (scenarios), is
heavily dependent on extrapolating current trends into the
distant time period in question. This includes predictions of
economic, demographic, sociopolitical, and military-technolog-
ical conditions that will shape the future environment and
directly affect any nation's security strategy. Taylor's
future security environment is a more interdependent, multipo-
lar world with an increasing population but decreasing sup-
plies of raw materials. Additionally, the world is more
competitive economically than militarily but a proliferation
of conventional and nuclear weapons as well as advances in
science and technology continue to foster security risks.
Finally, the creation of new industrial and economic infra-
structures results in sociopolitical changes that increasingly
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affect all nations of the world and cause a rise in national-
ism in many [ 199 ]
.
a. Scenario Drivers
Those trends that are particularly critical to
national and international issues are referred to as "scenario
drivers." Specifically, they include those trends "that shape
the political, economic, social, technological, and military
future of the United States and its relationships with other
nations of the world. "[200] As such, the drivers set the
themes for the alternative futures and, at the same time,
distinguish one scenario from the other. Still, the drivers
for each scenario are similar as they focus on those issues
that are central to U.S. national defense. Four basic drivers
are used to describe each scenario and will be discussed in
more detail later.
Jb. Attributes
Related to and dependent on the scenario driv-
ers are what Taylor calls the scenario "attributes." Very
simply, the scenario attributes are variables that describe
the individual makeup of each scenario qualitatively and
quantitatively. The number of U.S. military forces deployed
overseas would be an example of a scenario attribute. Even
more than the drivers, the attributes help distinguish one
scenario from another. Moreover, the scenario attributes
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provide planners with specific data which makes the structur-
ing of a national military strategy for each scenario more
realistic[201] .
4. Summary
This section of the study briefly introduced the
assumptions and trends used by Taylor to generate the four
scenarios in his Alternative World Scenarios For Strategic
Planning. Not surprisingly, the assumptions and especially
the trends describe a future that will be very different than
today. Apparently national security strategies will have to
place more emphasis on economic matters as well as on military
issues. Moreover, an entire new spectrum of threats could be
expected given the sociopolitical and military-technical
changes worldwide. The next section will describe each sce-
nario in more detail including the drivers that distinguish
each. More importantly, from each scenario will be determined
those elements within the categories of threats, constraints,
and resources that are essential to the development of an




Again, Taylor's scenarios address two specific time
periods for military strategic planning: the years 2005 and
2020. Since the focus of this study is on long-range strate-
gic planning, the scenarios will be presented primarily from
the 2020 perspective. The 2005 time period will be only
briefly discussed as necessary to explain the transition of
trends up to the year 2020. Moreover, 2005 corresponds more
closely to midrange rather than long-range planning for the
1 7purposes of this study.
The basic drivers for each scenario are, again,
national and international in scope and emphasize political
and economic issues that are appropriate for military plan-
ning. Moreover, while the four basic drivers for the scenari-
os are all similar, it is their differences that allow one
scenario to be distinguished from another. As such, they help
in determining those elements that should be considered in the
development of a nuclear strategy for each scenario. These
11. The description of the four scenarios comprises a major por-
tion of Taylor's book. For reference purposes, then, what fol-
lows is essentially a paraphrase of the book's presentation of
each scenario.
12. Long-range strategic planning is generally considered to
encompass the timeframe of 10 to 25 years. Less than 10 years is
usually not enough time for significant changes to occur that
would require creating new strategies. On the other hand, beyond
25 years often becomes intellectually difficult to conceptualize.
Nevertheless, the 30 year period in Taylor's scenarios is ade-
quate for this study.
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drivers will be listed individually at the beginning of each
scenario description. A more detailed examination of each
scenario will follow and expand upon the themes presented by
the basic drivers. In addition, the expanded description will
both highlight and summarize those elements of threats, con-
straints, and resources that are significant within each
scenario for the development of a nuclear strategy.
2. Scenario ALPHA: U.S. Isolationist
a. Scenar io Drivers^^
U.S. national political leaders advocate a strong
welfare, social investment economy
Western post industr ial infrastructures, along with
specialty industries, lack the capacity to support
national mobilization plans within the WW II frame-
work
The rise of nationalism worldwide has suppressed
U.S. international influence and has precluded U.S.
military presence overseas
U.S. community infrastructures (economies, politics,
demographics, resources, attitudes and values, etc.)
inhibit military (stationing) requirements and re-
duce installation investments
b. Threats
The absence of major wars for the past 30 years
in combination with widespread and rapid economic growth has
led to a relatively peaceful world. While the U.S. perception
of external threat is low, however, the world is still a
13. The description of the basic drivers for each scenario is
taken from Table 7 in Taylor, p. 29. This lists the four drivers
arranged in order of theme dominance for each scenario.
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highly competitive one, albeit more economically than mili-
tarily. Moreover, in 2020 trends indicating possible economic
recession have caused most nations of the world to arm them-
selves with the latest weapons to protect their national
interests. Specifically, some 60 percent are armed with early
21st century conventional weapons; 20 percent possess the
latest high-tech weapons and weapons systems; and 13 percent
have nuclear weapons and the capabilities to deliver them.
The Soviet Union remains a formidable military
power in 2020 although its shift in focus to primarily inter-
nal economic and social interests has resulted in a more
defensive military posture. Moreover, the USSR is becoming
increasingly more adventuresome and unpredictable economically
rather than militarily. Nevertheless, the Soviet Union's
communist ideology as well as its historic and traditional
socialist goals remain strong.
c. Constraints
The shift in focus to primarily social welfare
programs has placed defense at the low end of U.S. priorities
resulting in an economically constrained military. Moreover,
the U.S. enters the year 2020 in a mild economic slump, fur-
ther constraining military programs. The U.S. military's
global strategy is politically constrained by the worldwide
rise in nationalism as stated in the scenario drivers above.
This is mostly due to the expulsion of U.S. forces from over-
seas bases and port facilities.
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Demographically in 2020, the U.S. population is
older and more conservative with a greater proportion made up
of ethnic minorities. U.S. citizens are more concerned about
community and environmental issues and less so about the
military and international involvement. This attitude com-
bined with the overall growth of the U.S. population has
inhibited defense investments and precluded military installa-
tions anywhere near cities.
One final area to be considered here, but
equally applicable to the category of resources, is the disap-
pearance of heavy industry in the United States (and other
Western post industr ial nations). Because the heavy industry
needs are imported, U.S. infrastructures in 2020 lack the
capacity to support a World War II type of national mobiliza-
tion.
d. i?esources
The area of resources is closely associated to
the category of constraints since the development of a mili-
tary strategy and supporting force structure are heavily
dependent on the available resources. In 2020, the manpower
resource available for military service is becoming increas-
ingly limited as the U.S. population ages. Even so, most of
the returning forces that were expelled from overseas bases
have been deactivated or assigned to the Reserves. Still, the
peacetime joint/unified force (formed during the 2005 reorgan-
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ization of the armed forces) remains adequate for most contin-
gencies within a one-war strategy.
The loss of heavy industry in the U.S. has been
replaced by increasing numbers of light, specialty industries
resulting in a high-tech oriented military force structure.
Examples are the armed forces' use of robotics. Intelligence
and antiweapons provided by advanced space technology, and
computer simulated training.
3. Scenario BRAVO: U.S. World Peacekeeper
a. Scenazio Drivers
A tradeoff of nationalism worldwide for economic
development has strengthened U.S. international
influence and preserved U.S. military presence
overseas
Western post industrial infrastructures, along with
specialty industries, adequately buttress national
mobilization plans within the WW II framework
U.S. national political leaders advocate a strong
military defense
U.S. community infrastructures (economies, politics,
demographics, resources, attitudes and values, etc.)
underpin military (stationing) requirements and
installation investments
b. Threats
The broad transfer of technology in combination
with many new ad hoc economic and security agreements have
generated an increased frequency of trade wars and political
and economic power competitions. As a result, most nations of
the world are highly armed to protect their interests in this
extremely competitive scenario of 2020. This includes a 40
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percent increase since 1995 of those states with nuclear
weapons and delivery systems capability. Not surprisingly,
the U.S. and its allies perceive increasing external threats,
both economic and military, to their national interests in
this scenario.
The Soviet Union is primarily focused on its
internal economic development which remains far behind that of
the United States. Moreover, while the USSR continues to
support its client states, it has allowed economic cooperation
between many East European nations and Western Europe. Never-
theless, the Soviet Union has increased its military forces
and is a larger threat to world peace and more militarily
adventuresome than it was in 1990. The European sector of the
Soviet Union in particular remains highly capable of waging
war including worldwide military intervention. In addition,
like the U.S., the USSR maintains a substantial nuclear weap-
ons capability despite strategic nuclear arms reductions.
c. Constraints
Unlike the ALPHA scenario, this one presents
few constraints for the military as the U.S. defense sector in
general is well respected domestically as well as internation-
ally. While the loss of heavy industry is still a problem,
the U.S. is now a world leader of high-tech products, serv-
ices, information, and knowledge programs and systems. More-
over, U.S. achievements in science and advanced technology
combined with the growth of specialty industries have offset
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the economic loss of heavy industries. This has allowed the
U.S. by 2020 to regain the capacity to support national mobi-
lization plans for most contingencies within the World War II
framework. These same developments provided by the new spe-
cialty industries have reduced the U.S. trade deficit which
had increased during the early part of the century.
As with the previous scenario, social welfare
programs consume the major portion of the national budget.
The difference with this scenario, however, is that in size of
national expenditures social investments are directly followed
by a large defense budget. Moreover, the current Congress,
Presidential Administration, and general populace all support
extensive military programs. Finally, despite arms control
negotiations resulting in strategic nuclear weapons reduc-
tions, the U.S. retains a substantial nuclear capability.
d. Resources
The United States is universally recognized as
the most advanced military power of the world in 2020. More-
over, its international economic, sociopolitical, and moral
influence is unsurpassed by any other state. This strength-
ened international influence, in combination with the tradeoff
of nationalism for economic development by most industrial na-
tions, has preserved a large U.S. military presence overseas.
The U.S. military is seen as necessary and widely respected
domestically as well. Indeed, most of the general population
has accepted and approves of the 2005 military policy of
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sharing military facilities with communities to assist in
their development. Also enacted in 2005 is the Universal
Public Service program which provides the community and the
military with qualified. Amer icans through extensive training
in an agency of the Federal Government. Finally, the develop-
ment of plastic (polymer) munitions and lightweight, high-
impact armor plate has made the U.S. military more self-suffi-
cient. While technological achievements and innovations have
reduced the number of military personnel, however, overall
training requirements have increased.
4. Scenario CHARLIE: Neonat ionalism
a. Scenazio Drivezs
The rise of nationalism worldwide has suppressed
U.S. international influence and has precluded U.S.
military presence overseas
-- U.S. community infrastructures (economies, politics,
demographics, resources, attitudes and values, etc.)
inhibit military (stationing) requirements and re-
duce installation investments
U.S. national political leaders advocate a strong
military defense
Western post industr ial infrastructures, along with
specialty industries, lack the capacity to support
national mobilization plans within the WW II frame-
work
b. Threats
U.S. economic aid over the past two decades has
helped transform many of the Third World countries into modern
industrial nations, with many even adopting more representa-
tive forms of government. At the same time, however, many of
these countries turned to a revived nationalism as they felt
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their cultures increasingly threatened by the technological
changes that accompanied industrialization. As a result,
these and most other nations of the world have become heavily
armed to protect their interests in this economically competi-
tive world. This includes not only late 20th and early 21st
century conventional and high-tech weapons, but many with
nuclear weapons capabilities as well. In fact, the number of
nations with nuclear weapons and delivery systems in 2020 has
increased by two-thirds since the 1990s and by 25 percent
since 2005.
Concentrating pi^imarily on economic and social
development, the Soviet Union in 2020 has reduced its support
for client states and is militarily less adventuresome than it
was two decades ago. In cooperation with the United States,
the USSR has reduced its nuclear arms inventory and allowed
for inspection and verification of its arsenal, though it
retains a formidable warfighting capability. Moreover, the
Soviet Union has maintained a peaceful coexistence with West-
ern Europe and since 2005 has withdrawn most of its forces
from Eastern Europe. Thus, while it still retains a conven-
tional military capability, the Soviet Union does not pose a
threat to Western Europe in 2020.
c. Constraints
The worldwide revival of nationalism has sig-
nificantly suppressed U.S. political, economic, and military
influence, especially in Third World countries. Moreover,
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those nations that previously maintained security agreements
and treaties with the U.S. have nationalized foreign indus-
tries and expelled all Westerners. This includes the reclaim-
ing of all military bases on their territories and denying
overflights and port visitation rights to all U.S. nationals
and other Western foreigners. As a result, the U.S. has
withdrawn all of its military forces from its overseas bases
by 2020 and is forced to rely its own stockpiles of strategic
resources. This is even more critical since nearly all U.S.
heavy industries, including arms manufacturers, have relocated
to foreign industrial nations. The U.S. in 2020 is, there-
fore, left without the capacity to support any kind of nation-
al mobilization plans similar to those required during World
War II.
The increasing migration of skilled workers to
the city during the past 15 years has resulted in the growth
of megalopolises, including their expansion adjacent to mili-
tary installations. As a result, in 2020, more demands are
being made for the military to close their installations and
find other locations. Thus, while the general public opinion
of military service is high, U.S. community infrastructures
tend to inhibit military stationing requirements and reduce
installation investments in this 2020 scenario.
d. Resources
Military end strength is low in 2020, mostly as
a result of the deactivation (or assignment to the Reserves)
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of forces returning from overseas. Nevertheless, U.S. invest-
ments in technologically advanced, mostly space-related,
military systems have reduced the requirements for massive
armed forces in 2020. Moreover, lightweight munitions ord-
nance and armor plate designs by the U.S. high-polymer plastic
industry have offset the loss of heavy industry and somewhat
lessened the requirements for national mobilization. Finally,
the DoD's long-range defense plans and budgets, approved by
Congress, continue to emphasize the acquisition of advanced
technological equipment and weapons to maintain readiness with
a minimum of combat forces. Qualified personnel are provided
to the military and other Federal and state government agen-
cies by the Universal Public Service program after extensive
training.
5. Scenario DELTA: Muted Bipolar World
a. Scenario Drivers
U.S. community infrastructures (economies, politics,
demographics, resources, attitudes and values, etc.)
inhibit military (stationing) requirements and re-
duce installation investments
U.S. national political leaders advocate a strong
welfare, social investment program
Western postindustr ial infrastructures, along with
specialty industries, lack the capacity to support
national mobilization plans within the WW II frame-
work
A tradeoff of nationalism worldwide for economic
development has strengthened U.S. international




By 2020, many nations have traded off the
nationalism that had been growing worldwide since the turn of
the century for economic security and development. The U.S.
has been instrumental to these nations not only by granting
financial assistance, but, more importantly, by providing a
security umbrella. With this arrangement, the external threat
to U.S. and allied interests is generally perceived to be
about the same as it was in the early 1990s. Even so, most
nations of the world remain heavily armed with conventional
weapons, and many additionally possess more modern high-tech
weapons systems. Moreover, the number of nations with nuclear
weapons and delivery systems has doubled since 2005 and is
approximately 40 percent greater since 1995.
The Soviet threat is perceived by the U.S. to
be slightly less than it was in the early 1990s. This is
mostly due to the USSR's concentration on internal economic
problems. Moreover, this focus on internal economic develop-
ment has made the Soviet Union less of an immediate threat to
Western Europe. Nevertheless, with its substantial conven-
tional weapons capabilities, the Soviet Union remains a for-
midable warfighting power in 2020. This, and the fact that it
continues to militarily train and provide arms to its client




Most U.S. communities in 2020 are economically
viable, environmentally aware, and geographically expanding,
and, therefore, oppose the presence of military installations
even remotely close to major cities. Demographically, the
U.S. is largely represented by an older population and one
that is approaching 40 percent combined minority (i.e. blacks,
Hispanics, and Asians). This has politically, economically,
and socially impacted the United States both internationally
and domestically. Specifically, U.S. national political
leaders in 2020 advocate comprehensive national social welfare
programs and investments as a top priority. These Federal
social welfare programs are followed by, in order of priority,
investments in education, space, science and technology, and,
only lastly, defense programs.
As in the previous scenarios, this one is
characterized by the relocation of U.S. heavy industries to
foreign nations from which the U.S. imports such needs.
Because of this, most Western strategic analysts believed two
decades ago that the Western postindustr ial infrastructures
lacked the capacity to support national mobilization plans in
the event of a major war. The growth of specialty industries
like plastics (polymer), however, has proved this wrong with
the development of special ordnance, lightweight, high-impact
armor, and building construction beams.
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d. Resources
Already mentioned, but significant here, is the
growth of specialty industries in the U.S., such as plastics
and high-technology systems and materials. These industries
in fact support a flourishing economy, which makes the United
States the leading postindustr ial nation in the world in 2020.
Moreover, U.S. international political, economic, and military
influence has been strengthened by its assistance to those
many nations that have traded off nationalism for economic
security and development. This has also preserved the United
States military presence overseas, including bases, port
facilities and other installations. In contrast, however, is
the domestic opposition to military bases and installations
from U.S. communities that are more environmentally oriented




The scenarios from Charles W. Taylor's Alternative World
Scenar ios For Strategic Planning represent four possible
futures for the year 2020. As such, they provide the long-
range strategic planner with alternative views and considera-
tions that are helpful in the development of a strategy for
that time frame. As demonstrated in this study's review of
past strategies, the development of any long-range strategy
must start with an analysis of the key elements of threats.
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constraints, and resources. For that reason, Taylor's four
scenarios were presented in this study from that perspective.
It is clear from an examination of the basic drivers that
the four scenarios share common themes in the year 2020. For
example, the relocation of U.S. heavy industry to foreign
nations is common to each scenario. This is not unusual,
however, as certain trends and events are to be expected in
most any future scenario since they are based on extrapolating
current knowledge to that time period. Indeed, what distin-
guishes different scenarios from one another is the combina-
tion of those key elements of threats, constraints, and re-
sources.
Again, the purpose of this section of the study has been
to present the alternative futures methodology as a useful
tool for the long-range military strategic planner. More
specifically, the four alternative world futures serve as
models of the future security environment for the development
of a long-range U.S. nuclear strategy. While the scenarios do
not explicitly present alternative nuclear futures, they do
provide a general environment for the development of such a
strategy for the U.S. As a result, these scenarios will be
used in the next chapter to postulate U.S. nuclear strategies
based on changes in the long-range future security environ-
ment. Table 3 summarizes the various threats, constraints,




Scenar io Threats Constraints Resources
ALPHA Peaceful Loss Of Heavy Manpower
World Industry Limited
Economic More Loss Of Growth Of
Than Military Overseas Light And
Military Specialty
USSR Still Presence Industries
Pr imary
Less Domestic







BRAVO Extremely Arms Control World Leader
Competitive Of High-Tech
World Social Welfare Products,
Programs And Services,
USSR Still Investments Information,
Primary Consume The Knowledge
Military Major Portion Programs And
Threat Of The Budget Systems



























































































VI. THE "IDEAL" U.S. NUCLEAR STRATEGY FOR EACH SCENARIO
A. INTRODUCTION
As the title indicates, the purpose of this section of
the study is to develop a U.S. nuclear strategy for each of
the scenarios presented in the previous chapter. Since this
study has examined the development of past U.S. nuclear
strategies from the perspective of threats, constraints, and
resources, the same will be used here. It should be pointed
out once again that the development of any national security
strategy requires essentially the same type of process [ 202 ]
.
First, an articulation of national interests must be developed
from the nation's core values (e.g. personal freedoms, rights
of the individual, etc.). Second, the national interests must
be translated into broad goals or objectives that support
those interests. Next, an assessment must be made of the
international security environment including the major threats
to the national interests. This also includes forecasting
future threats and changes in the environment as well as
analyzing current trends. Finally, the development of a
national security strategy, however specific (e.g. nuclear
strategy), follows from considering the above factors in light
of constraints and resources.
A major assumption of this study is that basic U.S.
interests and goals remain fundamentally the same in the time
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frame of analysis. As alluded to above, these include "values
such as human dignity, personal freedom, individual rights,
the pursuit of happiness, peace and prosper ity. "[ 203 ] In
addition, the specific national interests which the U.S.
national security strategy seeks to assure and protect in-
clude :
-- The survival of the United States as a free and in-
dependent nation, with its fundamental values intact
and its institutions and people secure.
-- A healthy and growing U.S. economy to provide
opportunity for individual prosperity and a resource
base for our national endeavors.
— A stable and secure world, free of major threats to
U.S. interests.
— The growth of human freedom, democratic institu-
tions, and free market economies throughout the world
linked by a fair and open international trading system.
-- Healthy and vigorous alliance relationships .[ 204
1
Admittedly, one could imagine environmental changes that
could change U.S. interests, but that is beyond the scope of
this study. At the same time, though perhaps more a matter of
definition, one could argue that these core U.S. values and
interests do in fact remain constant regardless of changes in
the international environment. Nevertheless, for this study,
it is the environment that changes in the future scenarios,
especially the threats, constraints, and resources that are
fundamental to strategy development. The one exception is
that the last U.S. national interest from the above list is
likely to change in character. In other words, for this study
"healthy and vigorous alliance relationships" may mean those
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that are less rigid and formal and more economic than military
in nature.
The nuclear strategies presented for each scenario are
intended to be broad statements rather than "bean counting"
plans for the specific employment of forces and weapons sys-
tems. Still, the discussion of force structure and general
targeting plans is a fundamental part of any nuclear strategy
formulation. For example, such factors as the
offensive/defensive force structure orientation,
countervalue/counter force targeting options, and even the
viability of maintaining the nuclear triad will be explicitly
considered in each scenario. As with the historic U.S. nucle-
ar strategies, the future alternative strategies will be
explained in terms of the specific threats, constraints, and
resources that characterize each future scenario.
Two other assumptions of this study are concerned more
directly with the future existence and/or utility of nuclear
weapons themselves. First, nuclear weapons will continue to
exist in the future. That may seem a foregone conclusion
given that one purpose of this study (i.e. this section) is to
consider U.S. nuclear strategies for alternative future scena-
rios. Yet, based on current and predicted future domestic and
international constraints,-^^ it must be concluded that one
14. Like, for example, budgetary and economic constraints, moral
considerations, environmental and natural resources constraints,
and other similar ones presented earlier in the study.
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possible alternative nuclear future (however remote) is com-
plete and universal disarmament [ 205 ] . Moreover, even U.S. and
USSR national leaders have advocated this position and have
gone so far as to set time tables for its achievement [ 206 ]
.
Second, the primary objective of nuclear weapons and
nuclear strategy in the future will remain deterrence of
nuclear war. According to Dennis Drew and Donald Snow, "the
basic concern in developing nuclear strategy is finding the
best means to convince potential adversaries not to use their
nuclear f orces . " [ 207 ] While this objective has been central
to U.S. nuclear strategy from the beginning, however, the
nature of deterrence has changed as the strategy evolved [ 208 ]
.
Moreover, according to Philip Bobbitt, "the 1980s witnessed a
widespread disillusionment with the idea of strategic deter-
rence, the principal concept that had unified postwar nuclear
doctr ine . " [ 209 ] Nevertheless, most of these changes in or
disillusionment with nuclear deterrence have resulted from
variations in the perceived international environment as
characterized by different threats, constraints, and re-
sources. No matter how it is defined, however, deterrence
will continue to be the first priority of a future U.S. nucle-
ar strategy.
It is important to point out, however, that while deter-
rence remains the primary objective, the U.S. nuclear strategy
must provide for the possible scenario where deterrence fails.
This issue was previously mentioned in the discussion of the
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Maritime Strategy. Recall, for example, the quote from Admi-
ral Watkins' unclassified version of the Maritime Strategy:
".
. . should deterrence fail our strategy relies on forward
defense and allied cooperation to bring about war termination
on terms favorable to ourselves and our allies ." t 210 ] There-
fore, the actual employment of nuclear weapons (i.e. warfight-
ing) is as much a part of U.S. nuclear strategy as the primary
objective of deterrence. This particular subject will be
discussed in more detail later in the study.
While there are many variations of possible future U.S.
nuclear strategies, in general, the range of options can be
reduced to essentially three choices. These include: maintain
the current strategy and force structure; reduce the forces to
fit a minimum deterrent/assured destruction strategy; or
develop strategic defenses for a more balanced force struc-
ture/strategy [ 211 ] . Since these choices, again, characterize
only the most general range of options for future U.S. nuclear
strategies, more explicit alternatives and the key components
of each will be presented later.
Most of the debate on this subject involves not only the
offensive/defensive issue but, more importantly, the differ-
ence between a strategy of deterrence and a war-fighting
strategy [ 212 ] . It is the conclusion of this study that these
two strategies are not mutually exclusive. In other words,
building up offensive and defensive capabilities to improve a
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nuclear force structure's warfighting capacity may actually
enhance the credibility of deterrence.
This discussion of deterrence and war-fighting brings up
one final issue--the objectives of the U.S. nuclear strategy.
Again, these objectives are not all inclusive nor are they
novel [213]. Instead, they are the factors considered most
important in this study to the development of a nuclear force
structure that supports the national nuclear strategy. The
first objective of deterrence has already been mentioned and
needs no further discussion at this time. The remaining
objectives fall under the category of war-fighting character-
istics and become more important if the first objective of
deterrence should fail. At the same time, at least in the
opinion of this researcher, the war-fighting characteristics
of these other objectives of nuclear strategy tend to comple-
ment the main objective of deterrence.
First, the force structure that supports the nuclear
strategy must provide some means for limiting damage to the
U.S., again, if deterrence fails. Mostly, this means develop-
ing and maintaining some form of strategic defense systems.
Second, if nuclear war is initiated as a limited conflict, the
U.S. nuclear strategy should provide the capability for esca-
lation control. Not only does this objective support the
previous one of damage limitation, it also prevents an adver-
sary from controlling U.S. objectives by threatening larger
scale attacks. Finally, a U.S. nuclear strategy should allow
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for nuclear war termination that is acceptable to American
interests and supports national objectives. This means main-
taining a survivable reserve force for the purpose of threat-
ening the enemy with further damage unless the war is termi-
nated on U.S. terms. As a result, while related to the previ-
ous two, this objective includes more specific requirements
for limiting damage to the nuclear force structure. In addi-
tion to strategic defenses, this objective includes enhancing
the force structure through such things as hardening and
mobil ity
.
These objectives clearly represent the ideal characteris-
tics of a future U.S. nuclear strategy. Recall, however, that
the objective of this chapter is to present the "ideal" U.S.
nuclear strategy for each scenario based on the specific
threats, constraints, and resources. Moreover, just as any
one scenario is unlikely to represent the actual future envi-
ronment, the postulated nuclear strategies also may not be
completely realistic. Nevertheless, again, this kind of
analysis is useful to the long-range military strategic plan-
ner. Specifically, as concerns the development of a future
U.S. nuclear strategy, it allows the planner to consider the
important elements in one vital area--the environment.
B. SCENARIO ALPHA
Although this scenario describes a relatively peaceful
world that has been without any major war for the last 30
years, there still exists a latent threat to U.S. interests.
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Mostly, this threat is due to the general rise in worldwide
nationalism resulting from economic prosperity. Moreover, not
only are most nations heavily armed but the number with nucle-
ar weapons capabilities has significantly increased since the
end of the twentieth century. As a result, "world conditions
in 2020 make U.S. reliance on nuclear deterrence more critical
than it was at the turn of the century. "[ 214 ] At the same
time, this rise in nationalism has eliminated U.S. military
presence overseas, reduced the American international influ-
ence, and virtually eradicated the former alliance structures.
This has reduced the need for extended deterrence and made the
U.S. more isolationist politically, militarily, and economi-
cally.
Coupled with these international events, U.S. domestic
constraints have made defense in general a low priority and
significantly reduced overall military spending. This encom-
passes all areas of the armed forces including research and
development and even modernization of nuclear weapons pro-
grams. The combination of these factors has made the U.S.
shift to a nuclear strategy of assured destruction that is
supported by a minimum deterrent force posture.
The expanding U.S. population and growing community
protests have led increasingly to the closure of local mili-
tary bases including nuclear weapons facilities. This has
forced the defense community to reorganize the entire military
force structure and place more emphasis on remote naval bases.
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As concerns the nuclear forces, the greatest effect has been a
shift from a relatively balanced triad to an overwhelming
emphasis on the sea-based component. This specific reorgani-
zation of the nuclear forces has accomplished a couple of
important objectives. First, the SSBN force has long been
recognized as the most survivable leg of the nuclear triad.
Thus, by preserving and enhancing this component, the credi-
bility of the U.S. nuclear deterrent is maintained. At the
same time, the longer-range and more accurate SLBMs now de-
ployed on the SSBNs reserve a varfighting counterforce capa-
bility while reinforcing the assured destruct ion/countervalue
targeting U.S. nuclear strategy. Second, because these weap-
ons are deployed at sea, they are in effect out of sight of
the general public and, hence, not subject to protests.
The overall defensive posture of the U.S. military and,
in particular the nuclear deterrent strategy, have been
strengthened by "the deployment of a limited, strategic mis-
sile defense system in space. "[215] Nevertheless, again,
defense continues as a low priority as reflected by drastical-
ly reduced military spending. This justifies the shift in
U.S. nuclear strategy to assured destruction/minimum deter-
rence. Other than developments in strategic defenses, the one
exception to reduced defense spending is the continued modern-
ization of naval strategic nuclear forces.
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C. SCENARIO BRAVO
This scenario represents an extremely competitive world
environment, both militarily and economically, in the year
2020. In addition to the USSR military buildup, most nations
of the world are heavily armed with conventional, even high-
tech weapons. Moreover, partly due to the broad transfer of
technology, the number of nations with nuclear weapons capa-
bilities has increased by 40 percent since 1995. At the same
time, the U.S. is recognized by most nations as the foremost
economic and military power in the world. As a result, U.S.
international influence is strong and its overseas military
presence is growing. In addition, ad hoc yet formal bilateral
economic and political/military agreements have replaced the
former rigid international alliance structures. This world
situation has made the U.S. security umbrella and extended
deterrence more important than ever.
Domestic support (both national leadership and the gener-
al population) for the military, strong national pride, and
the perceived greater world threat have combined to allow
substantially increased U.S. defense spending. The result has
been new and more extensive research and development programs
and general buildups in all areas of the military, especially
the nuclear forces. All three legs of the nuclear triad have
been strengthened and modernized as have the tactical nuclear
weapons systems. This offensively-oriented force structure
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allows for flexible targeting (mixed counterf orce/counterval-
ue ) and supports the U.S. balanced varfighting nuclear deter-
rent strategy.
Strategic nuclear arms reductions by the United States
and the Soviet Union in the early part of this century have
had little effect on the force structures in 2020. The one
exception for the U.S. was delays in establishing some form of
strategic defense systems but more recent developments in
space technology have overcome this early disadvantage. Thus,
U.S. nuclear strategy in 2020 is still fundamentally one of
deterrence but it is made more credible with a more balanced
warfighting force structure.
D. SCENARIO CHARLIE
The rise of worldwide nationalism is even more pronounced
here than in Scenario ALPHA but likewise has suppressed U.S.
international political, economic, and military influence.
Moreover, the elimination of U.S. military presence overseas
includes not only the loss of bases but denial of port visita-
tion and overflight rights. These events have made the ex-
tended deterrent component of U.S. nuclear strategy essential-
ly obsolete in 2020.
Overall the external threats to U.S. interests are more
economic in nature than military or political. Nevertheless,
most nations of the world are heavily armed to protect their
interests in this economically competitive environment where
trade wars and restrictions abound. This includes a 25 per-
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cent increase in the number of nations with nuclear weapons
capabilities since 2005. More than anything else, it is this
growing proliferation of nuclear weapons capable nations that
has made the U.S. continue to rely on some form of nuclear
deterrent strategy.
A description of the exact form of nuclear deterrent
strategy employed by the U.S. in this scenario actually begins
with a review of the various constraints presented earlier.
First, U.S. strategic nuclear forces have been moderately
reduced by late twentieth century bilateral arms control
agreements with the Soviet Union. Moreover, increased nation-
al focus on social welfare programs has recently reduced
defense spending and further constrained U.S. strategic nucle-
ar force levels. At the same time, the targeting requirements
have increased mostly as a result of the proliferation of
nuclear powers. This has placed even greater demands on the
already limited U.S. nuclear force structure, although it is
offset somewhat by the elimination of the extended deterrence
requirements. In addition, the expanding U.S. population and
growing community protests have forced the closure of bases
and other military installations including nuclear weapons
facilities. As a result, most of the forces in the nuclear
triad increasingly are being concentrated in the sea-based
component
.
In contrast, U.S. national leaders advocate a strong
defense and the general public opinion of military service is
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high. Thus, roost in the U.S. believe that the maintenance of
a nuclear deterrence strategy of some form is in the national
interest. This support over the past several decades has
provided the U.S. with a strong technological base and contin-
ued extensive military research and development programs.
Consequently, the U.S. military has benefited greatly from
developments in advanced technology, especially that utilizing
the space dimension. The most apparent benefits for U.S.
nuclear forces in 2020 have been in the area of strategic
defenses
.
Added together, these factors have produced a U.S. nucle-
ar strategy in 2020 that is referred to as balanced minimum
deterrence. Very simply, this means a smaller offensive
nuclear force structure concentrated mostly in SSBNs and
targeted mainly against enemy countervalue assets that is
balanced by developments in strategic defense.
E. SCENARIO DELTA
Many nations of the world in this scenario have traded
nationalism for economic security and development. As the
leading postindustr ial nation of the world in 2020, the U.S.
has been the chief provider for these nations. This has not
only strengthened U.S. international political, economic, and
military influence but preserved its military presence over-
seas. Even so, most nations remain heavily armed and the
number with nuclear weapons capabilities has doubled since
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2005. Other external threats to the U.S. remain relatively
the same as they were in the early 1990s. The one exception
is that the Soviet threat even to Western Europe is slightly
less as the USSR is more concerned with internal economic
development. Accordingly, the requirements for U.S. extended
nuclear deterrence are slightly less in 2020 though the policy
remains viable and includes more recipients.
While the threats in 2020 may be similar to those of the
1990s, domestic constraints are more pronounced. The emphasis
by U.S. political leadership on social welfare programs and
investments has significantly reduced military spending.
Moreover, in addition to social welfare programs, defense
follows, in order of priority, investments in education,
space, and science and technology. At the same time, an older
and more ethnically represented U.S. population opposes mili-
tary investments and installations that might be harmful to
the environment or consume valuable resources. This kind of
vehement opposition has forced the closure of several local
bases and other military installations including nuclear
weapons facilities near many growing communities.
As related to nuclear strategy, these constraints have
made the U.S. rely on fewer numbers of forces to support its
policies. More importantly, the closure of bases in particu-
lar has forced the U.S. to concentrate the majority of its
nuclear weapons in sea-based platforms (SSBNs) homeported
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locally and overseas. As a result, the nuclear triad is
quickly becoming a single component force structure.
Thus, the U.S. is constrained in this scenario to a
survivable minimum dete^rrent nuclear strategy. Moreover, it
will remain a minimum deterrent/assured destruction strategy
until adequate funding can be achieved for programs aimed at
improving its warfighting capabilities. Such programs would
include developments in land-based mobile missiles and strate-
gic defenses. These improvements would not only establish a
warfighting force structure but enhance the credibility of
nuclear deterrence.
F. SUMMARY
The two assumptions about future nuclear strategy that
were presented in the introduction to this chapter served to
bound the development of the U.S. policy in each scenario.
These were that nuclear weapons would continue to exist in the
future and deterrence would remain the primary objective of
U.S. nuclear strategy. Of all the probable assumptions about
future U.S. nuclear strategy, these are perhaps the most
realistic. Robert Levine appears to reinforce this assertion
when writing about future strategic nuclear policy:
. . . the two fundamental premises for strategic nuclear
policy: Nuclear knowledge will not be unlearned, and
the weapons will remain unprecedently dangerous; . . .




The increasing proliferation of nations with nuclear weapons
that Taylor presents for each scenario also supports these
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assumptions. At the same time, while each of the scenarios
proposes different future environments, there are other common
threads that connect all of them. Among these are, for exam-
ple, threats that are more economic than military in nature
and the increasing mult ipolar ity of the international environ-
ment. These and other common links in the areas of threats,
constraints, and resources were useful in determining a na-
tional nuclear strategy for each of the alternative futures.
Several key components were determined at the outset to
have particular relevance to the development any future nucle-
ar strategy. These include: the makeup of the nuclear triad;
the status of U.S. extended deterrence; targeting objectives
(i.e. countervalue/counter force ) ; and developments in strate-
gic defenses. These are highlighted in Table 4 below. Simi-
larly, each of these components could be affected by more
specific variations in threats, constraints, and resources.
For example, the makeup of the triad is affected by defense
spending, the closure of local bases, etc.; extended deter-
rence depends on U.S. military presence overseas (i.e. bases,
port facilities, etc.), the international alliance structure,
U.S. international political, economic, and military influ-
ence, etc.; and so on. Obviously, some factors like defense
spending affected all components, yet it was the sum total of
all changes that influenced the formulation of a nuclear
strategy for each scenario. In addition to these components,
however, other factors were also taken into account in the
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development of the overall nuclear strategy. Among these were
arms control limitations, domestic support for national de-
fense and the U.S. military, and specific threats to U.S.
interests (nuclear and otherwise).
Many of the conclusions drawn from this section of the
study are similar to those of more notable works in this
area[217]. For example, one major conclusion is that the
credibility of nuclear deterrence is enhanced by improving the
warfighting capabilities of the force structure that supports
it. This includes developing a force structure that will
provide for damage limitation, escalation control, and war
termination should deterrence fail. In addition to develop-
ments in strategic defense, mobility, and hardening that were
presented here, this also includes improvements in such areas
as CI and warhead accuracy. Yet, this study also proposes
some rather radical changes in the nuclear force structure, and
strategy (e.g. abandoning the triad concept and adopting
assured destruction) that appear unfeasible today.
Just as the scenarios may not accurately represent the
actual future environment, however, none of the proposed
nuclear strategies may be realistic either. More important is
the pattern of thought and analysis that characterized this
process of determining the "ideal" U.S. nuclear strategy for
each alternative future. Specifically, this chapter demon-
strates how analyzing the future security environment from the
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perspective of threats, constraints, and resources can be
useful in the development of future U.S. nuclear strategies.
TABLE 4
SUMMARY OF "IDEAL" U.S. NUCLEAR STRATEGIES
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VII. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS
A. SUMMARY OF MAJOR AR'GUMENTS
This study started out by describing the strategic plan-
ning process and, in particular, focused on long-range plan-
ning in the military. Within that description, the usefulness
of trend analysis in forecasting was discussed as were the
common problems associated with long-range military strategic
planning. In addition, various methodologies were presented
as useful techniques in the process itself. Of these, the
alternative futures/scenarios methodology was highlighted as
an especially valuable tool to this planning procedure.
Moreover, this particular methodology was introduced as the
one that was to be employed exclusively in this study.
As the focus of this study is specifically nuclear
strategic planning, the next step was to describe the evolu-
tion of U.S. nuclear strategy from the end of World War II to
the present. Again, this section was not simply intended to
be an historical review, but instead an examination of the
development of U.S. nuclear strategy as a function of threats,
constraints, and resources. Moreover, by describing the
formulation of U.S. nuclear strategy from that particular
perspective, this chapter attempted to demonstrate the ap-




The next section of the study concluded this examination
of the evolution of U.S. nuclear strategy by describing the
most recent developments from the same perspective. Implicit
in this chapter is the realization that research and develop-
ment programs that support these strategies are intended for
the long-term. Therefore, the purpose here was to indicate
the direction of U.S. nuclear strategy development for the
future. In addition, this section examines the development of
the U.S. Navy's Maritime Strategy from the perspective of
threats, constraints, and resources. Moreover, the specific
focus in this examination is the nuclear portion of the Mari-
time Strategy. Thus, that part of the chapter attempts to
demonstrate the applicability of U.S. nuclear strategy by
focusing on one specific armed services' role in that overall
national military strategy.
The presentation of Taylor's alternative world scenarios
in the following chapter describes four future environments
that are used later to postulate future U.S. nuclear strate-
gies. These scenarios are not intended to accurately describe
the exact future that will actually exist. Instead, they are
four possible future environments based mostly on extrapolat-
ing current trends to that time frame. Because Taylor's
conclusions and methodology have been critically analyzed and
accepted by noted scholars, however, his work was deemed
credible enough to represent the alternative future environ-
ments for this study.
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Finally, the last chapter proposed "ideal" U.S. nuclear
strategies for each of the four Taylor scenarios. Since each
of the scenarios were presented in the previous chapter from
the perspective of threats, constraints, and resources, the
planned nuclear strategies were based strictly on the same
type of analysis. Thus, the purpose of this study was to
demonstrate how the alternative futures methodology could be
used to develop probable future security environments for the
purpose of long-range military strategic planning. More
importantly, this study attempted to demonstrate how future
U.S. nuclear strategy could be developed by analyzing one
important area--the environment--f rom the perspective of
threats, constraints, and resources.
B. COMPARISON WITH OTHER APPROACHES
Again, the development of any national strategy begins
with an articulation of fundamental U.S. values and interests.
This is followed by specific objectives that through their
achievement are designed to support the national interests.
Next, an assessment is made of the external threats to the
national interests. Finally, a strategy is formulated by
analyzing the above factors and determining the current U.S.
strengths and weaknesses (i.e. resources and
constraints )[ 218 ] . The assumption in this study, however, is
that the fundamental U.S. values and interests will be essen-
tially the same in the proposed future environments. As a
result, it is the environment itself that determines how U.S.
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nuclear strategy will change for each alternative future.
Specifically, by analyzing each environment from the perspec-
tive of threats, constraints, and resources, nuclear strate-
gies that will best fit each particular future can be postu-
lated.
One of the most notable recent studies on the future
security environment was completed by the President's Commis-
sion On Integrated Long-Term Strategy! 219 ] . This report seems
to confirm Taylor's analysis as well as that of other scholar-
ly works[220] as concerns the predicted structure of the
future world setting. Specifically, it appears that the long-
range (10-30 years) future environment will be one with exter-
nal threats to U.S. interests that are more economic than
military in nature. As a result, the growing economic coun-
tries will become increasingly more important international
powers, and, thus potential threats to U.S. interests. This
will likely include, for example, the nations of East Asia,
especially Japan, China, and South Korea. Moreover, by most
accounts, the Soviet threat will be less as the USSR focuses
more on internal problems like, for example, economic develop-
ment. Nevertheless, the Soviet Union maintains a formidable
warfighting capacity and continues to drive the size and
structure of the U.S. defense budget[2211.
Economic improvement for most nations will likely be
accompanied by a worldwide rise in nationalism. That in
itself and the fact that most nations will remain heavily
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armed to protect their interests poses at least a latent
threat to the U.S. Moreover, the increasing proliferation of
advanced weapons systems and broad transfer of technology
significantly raises the number of nations with high-tech
munitions. This includes the proliferation of nations with
nuclear weapons and delivery systems technology[ 222 ] . These
latter events in particular reinforce predicted changes in the
global distribution of military power away from the current
superpowers to a more multi-polar and potentially hostile
environment [ 223 ] . Moreover, there will likely be a shift away
from the current rigid bipolar international alliance struc-
ture to one that is characterized by less formal economic and
political/military security agreements [ 224 ] . That in itself
implies changes in the extended deterrence portion of the
future U.S. nuclear strategy.
This changing world situation could also have important
consequences in the area of constraints for future U.S. nucle-
ar strategies. For example, the worldwide rise in nationalism
in parallel with increasing economic and military independence
of many nations could result in the loss of overseas bases for
the U.S. This virtual elimination of the U.S. military
presence overseas would constrain American global interests
and require reformulation of national military
strategies t 225] . Domestically, the loss of heavy industries,
for example, challenges the future U.S. capacity for national
industrial mobilization. This reduced mobilization base could
115
become crucial in the event of a protracted conflict in which
the U.S. was involved [ 226 ] . Again, these constraints not only
potentially affect the overall national nuclear strategy but
more specifically how U.S. nuclear forces will be deployed and
employed in the future.
Other domestic constraints in the U.S. are related to the
current economic, demographic, and military-technical
trends[227]. For example, an aging U.S. population and one
that is increasingly represented by a larger percentage of
ethnic minorities will likely be more concerned primarily with
social and welfare programs. That and related issues like
environmental concerns could influence national leaders to
reduce military spending and make defense a lower national
priority. In addition, the aging population in combination
with such things as the AIDS epidemic and the growing drug
problem could constrain the manpower available for military
service [228 ]
.
In addition to manpower, other future environmental
factors in the area of resources could impact long-range U.S.
national security (including nuclear) strategies. Mostly,
this has to do with technological achievements including those
already currently under development or in early use. As
concerns nuclear weapons, this could include improvements in
warhead accuracy and silo hardening as well as developments in
mobility and strategic defenses.
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In summary, the future security environment described by
this study's alternative future scenarios is very similar to
that developed by other recent studies. Therefore, the valid-
ity of these scenarios for this study's development of future
U.S. nuclear strategies is strengthened. Moreover, these
other studies also support the methodological approach of
examining and analyzing the environment for developing future
U.S. nuclear strategies.
C. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
The difficulty in long-range strategic planning is fore-
casting future patterns of political/military relations. Yet,
inability to predict these patterns or deficiencies in the
long-term planning process can have adverse impacts on the
nation's security. This is especially true "given the consid-
erable lead-times associated with the development and acquisi-
tion of contemporary weapon systems ."[ 229 ] Thus, those nucle-
ar weapons that are chosen for development in any given year
will essentially determine at least the long-range force
structure and probably the future U.S. nuclear strategy. This
makes it even more essential that long-range nuclear strategic
planning be able to analyze the future environment with re-
spect to current conditions.
This study has touched on several issues that are impor-
tant to the development of a national nuclear strategy.
Mostly, these were grouped under the categories of threats,
constraints, and resources and included such topics as nuclear
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targeting, deterrence versus warfighting, and the various
strategic nuclear force structure requirements. Other issues
like, for example, the utility of tactical nuclear weapons
were clearly beyond the scope of this study and therefore were
not discussed. Thus, while extended deterrence was mentioned
as part of the overall national nuclear strategy, this study
restricted its examination to U.S. strategic nuclear issues.
Another topic only discussed briefly in this work is strategic
defenses and their implications for nuclear strategy. There-
fore, these are examples of areas that warrant further re-
search and examination.
There are other areas that proved difficult to this
study's development of future U.S. nuclear strategies and,
therefore, require further analysis. For example, the
strategy's capability to deter small nuclear powers as well as
the Soviet Union was not explicitly addressed. Given the
projected proliferation of nations with nuclear weapons capa-
bilities, this requirement for future nuclear strategies
becomes increasingly important. Another issue particularly
difficult to resolve in this study was the difference between
nuclear deterrence and warfighting. The question seems to be,
are these two concepts at opposite ends of a spectrum or are
they complementary? In this author's opinion, as concluded
earlier, developing the forces' warfighting capabilities may
actually enhance nuclear deterrence. Still, this is an issue
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that troubles today's strategists and planners and will likely
continue to do the same in the future.
Finally, while separate strategies were proposed for each
alternative future scenario, no recommendation was made for an
overall U.S. nuclear strategy that would fit all scenarios.
It was pointed out, however, that just as any one scenario was
not likely to represent the "actual" future environment, the
proposed strategies were also unlikely to portray the "ideal"
future U.S. nuclear strategy. Nevertheless, it is worth
examining a future strategy that will fit a broad range of
alternative future environments. That kind of strategy is
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